17 the Peruvian Government’s intimation that it would not participate in the processpersuaded the Commission to withdraw the case. 59. In its note of August 26, the Government insisted that the withdrawal of the application was a unilateral act by the Commission which Peru had not requested. At the public hearing, the Commission admitted that “[i]t is true that the Government of Peru did not request the withdrawal of the case, nor its resubmission.” Consequently, it is of little importance whether or not Peru benefitted, as the Commission argues, from the new time limits that resulted from the withdrawal. Even if it had, that would not prevent it from invoking the expiration of the time limit as a preliminary objection. The withdrawal of the case did not undermine the Peruvian Government’s right of defense nor did it prevent it from exercising any of the other rights recognized in the Convention. 60. More than seven months elapsed between the withdrawal of the case and the filing of the new application. Regardless of whether the original period had expired on May 31, or June 5, 1991, there is no question that February 14, 1992, substantially exceeds the timely and reasonable limits that, as the Court has stated, govern the proceeding. Even if the Commission understood the Peruvian Government to have requested the withdrawal, such a request, however reasonable, could not have been granted because the time limit provided by the Convention for filing an application had already expired. Furthermore, as already stated, that is not one of the factors that could have led to a suspension of the periods. 61. Without taking up the merits of the Commission’s application, the Court will find that it was filed after the expiration of the appropriate time limit. Nevertheless, a reading of Article 51 leads to the conclusion that a declaration of this nature cannot entail the neutralization of the other protective mechanisms set forth in the American Convention. Hence, the Commission continues to enjoy all the other powers conferred on it in that article, which is, furthermore, consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty. 62. Having stated the foregoing, it is not necessary for the Court to analyze the remaining objections. 63. The Court must preserve a fair balance between the protection of human rights, which is the ultimate purpose of the system, and the legal certainty and procedural equity that will ensure the stability and reliability of the international protection mechanism. In the instant case, to continue with a proceeding aimed at ensuring the protection of the interests of the alleged victims in the face of manifest violations of the procedural norms established by the Convention itself would result in a loss of the authority and credibility that are indispensable to organs charged with administering the system for the protection of human rights. Now, therefore, THE COURT unanimously, 1. Declares that the application dated February 14, 1992, was filed by the Commission after the expiration of the period provided in Article 51(1) of the Convention.