resolve the conflict concerning ownership of the land, it was not necessary to exhaust them in order to enforce compliance with what had already been agreed. In this regard, it should be noted that it should evidently be understood that, with this agreement, the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies was complied with or, in any case, following the signature of the agreement, it was not necessary to comply with the said rule. To the contrary, the purpose of the conciliation agreement would not have been to resolve the conflict and could merely have been an instrument to prolong it. In other words, in this hypothesis, having to resort to other national instances to enforce compliance with what the State had agreed to would entail returning the case to the adversarial stage – to a new trial – this time of an administrative nature. Therefore, what was agreed on by the State would not have the significance of a real and effective undertaking, given that it did not grant legal security and certainty and was insufficient for the purpose sought. In this regard, since it ended a conflict and, therefore, ruled out the need to resort to the courts or pertinent jurisdictional instances, the conciliation agreement signified that it considered exhausted the remedies that could have been filed with such instances. It is also pertinent to note that the execution of agreements made by the State is an obligation of the State and not of the other party. Having reached an agreement, it was for the State to take all necessary measures to comply with its commitments. This is dictated by the principle of good faith. To this end, the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) is equally applicable, and also that no State may invoke its internal law to justify its failure to comply with an international obligation, or invoke it to fail to comply with what it has agreed to in the domestic sphere and alleged in the international sphere. Consequently and in the situation described in the instant case, there would be no domestic remedy to exhaust; in other words, the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies would not be applicable to this case. B. Failure to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the death of Félix Ordóñez Suazo Regarding the objection filed by the State in relation to the death of Félix Ordóñez Suazo, it should be recalled that this constituted a supervening fact in the case; 7 therefore, once it occurred, the appropriate action was not to file a preliminary objection in the case as the State did, but rather to argue the need to lodge a new petition before the Commission. Naturally, as repeatedly indicated, 8 the petitioner must comply with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies before lodging a petition with the Commission and, evidently, this was not possible in this case. However, neither could the State argue the need for the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies in the said objection, nor could any of the reasons to rule out this obligation be invoked. 7 8 Para. 33. Footnote No. 5. 2