7 20. In the same Separate Opinion in the case of Massacre de Pueblo Bello, I supported the above mentioned impossibility of dissociation between Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention as an “intangible jurisprudential advance” (paras. 4452).17 Then I referred to the right of access to justice lato sensu, remarking that: "In the Reports I presented, in my then capacity as President of the InterAmerican Court, to the competent bodies of the American States Association (ASO), e.g., on April 19, 2002 and on October 16, 2002, I defended my understanding in the sense of the broad scope of the right of access to justice at international level, the right of access to justice lato sensu.18 Such a right not only boils down to the formal access, stricto sensu, to the judicial instance (both domestic and international), but it also encompasses the right to the prompt response by the judicial system, and it underlies in interrelated regulations of the American Convention (as Articles 25 and 8), apart from permeating the domestic law of the States Party.19 The right of access to justice, with its own legal content, means, lato sensu, the right to obtain justice. It is thus configured as the right to the realization of justice itself. One of the main elements of that right is precisely the direct access to a competent court through an effective and quick remedy, and the right to be immediately heard by said court – independent and unbiased – at both national and international level (Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention). As I remarked in a recent work, here we can see a real right to Law, that is to say, the right to a legal system – both at national and international level – which effectively safeguards the fundamental rights of the human being”20 (paras. 61-62). 21. Finally, in the same Separate Opinion in the case of Massacre de Pueblo Bello, I repeated my understanding in the sense that the right to Law constitutes a “jus cogens imperative:” "The inevitable dissociation between Articles 25 and 8 of the American Convention (supra) I support leads to characterize access to justice as part of the jus cogens, understanding said access as the complete realization of justice, that is, taking the intangibility of all legal guarantees in the sense of Articles 25 and 8 taken jointly as part of the jus cogens. There can be no doubt that the fundamental guarantees, common to International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law,21 which are of universal vocation as they apply in all and every circumstance, form an imperative right (of the jus cogens scope), and entail erga omnes protection obligations.22 . In the same Concurring Opinion, I also referred to the overcoming of difficulties regarding to the right to an effective remedy in the jurisprudential construction of the European Court of Human Rights (paras. 53-59). 17 . Cf. also A.A. Cançado Trindade, "El Derecho de Acceso a la Justicia Internacional y las Condiciones para Su Realización en el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos", 37 Revista del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (2003) pp. 53-83; A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Hacia la Consolidación de la Capacidad Jurídica Internacional de los Peticionarios en el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos", 37 Revista del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (2003) pp. 13-52. 18 . In that sense, cf. E.A. Alkema, "Access to Justice under the ECHR and Judicial Policy - A Netherlands View", in Afmaelisrit pór Vilhjálmsson, Reykjavík, Bókaútgafa Orators, 2000, pp. 21-37. 19 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, vol. III, Porto Alegre/Brasil, S.A. Fabris Ed., 2002, chapter XX, p. 524, para. 187. 20 . E.g., Article 75 of Protocol I (of 1977) to the Geneva Convention (of 1949) on International Humanitarian Law. 21 . Cf., also in that sense, e.g., M. El Kouhene, Les garanties fondamentales de la personne en Droit humanitaire et droits de l'homme, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1986, pp. 97, 145, 148, 161 and 241. 22