must be protected from conducts which imply a serious infringement thereof and where they are proportionate to the seriousness of the damage caused. The criminal definition of a conduct must be clear and accurate, as established by the case law of the Court regarding Article 9 of the American Convention” (para. 77). 22. According to the guidelines set by the Court as regards malicious conduct, awareness and the will to defame, libel or insult, are an essential element. Should any of these elements be absent, the act under discussion would not fit into the criminal definition. Another necessary element is that the expressions made in public are objectively and seriously injurious, that is, that they have the capability to cause harm to the good name of the person to whom they were addressed, which is to be proven and examined by a court in each case. It is clear, for instance, that when the commission of a crime is falsely attributed to someone through a medium, given the implications this implies for his reputation, said individual becomes an offender in the eyes of the public opinion. 23. Insofar as what the Court has defined as “serious damage” has been made, criminal proceedings should be resorted to (para. 77). This is so as certain malicious violations of the right to have one’s honor respected may cause serious harm to an individual, quite more serious than the damage it may result from, for instance, the commission of certain crimes against property or personal integrity. Hence, the Court finds it in line with the provisions of the Convention that the State ensures the appropriate means –including criminal proceedings- aimed at ceasing in certain harmful conducts, within the framework of reasonability and proportionality. 24. Accordingly, the Court has established the fundamental basis and criteria to be used in criminal proceedings brought in order to determine subsequent responsibilities where the right to have one’s honor respected has been impaired. Along these lines, the lack of reasonability or proportionality of the proceedings or sanctions, both in civil and criminal proceedings, may result in the violation of fundamental rights. 25. What is to be emphasized is not whether the defense and protection of a fundamental right such as the right to have one’s honor respected and one’s reputation recognized are to be exercised, in the abstract, through criminal or civil judicial proceedings, but rather that, whatever be the mechanisms chosen, they are in conformity with the rules regarding due process of law and the right to a fair trial. And, what is even more important, with the proportionality of the sanction in terms of the damage caused, which is the task of judges. 26. Along these lines, therefore, the Court has established that criminal proceedings do not restrict in and of themselves freedom of thought and expression. The necessity and proportionality of the criminal proceedings must be in line with the seriousness of the damage caused rather than with an abstract consideration which prohibits them for reasons which are not derived from the provisions of the Convention. This is one of the legitimate mechanisms expressly recognized by the Court –in accordance with the parameters defined- when it established that “it is legitimate for an individual who considers that his honor has been impaired to resort to the judicial mechanisms established by the State to protect it” (para. 55). Diego García-Sayán Judge