16. The right to have one’s honor respected must, therefore, be protected. Particularly, the so-called “objective honor,” which refers to the value that others attach to the individual in question insofar as his reputation or his good name in his social context has been impaired. Along these lines, in accordance with the legal provisions that protect the right to have one’s honor respected, freedom of thought and expression as a fundamental right does neither sustain nor legitimize the use of abusive expressions or terms which go beyond the legitimate exercise of the right to express one’s opinions or the exercise of the right to criticism. 17. Law has the intrinsic capability to properly solve the conflicts which may arise between rules that protect opposing legal rights. Thus, freedom of thought and expression and the right to have one’s honor respected are the poles of an important conflict. In this regard, judges play an essential role in effectively determining the limits of each of said rights, while protecting the full exercise of and respect for both. The State must comply with its obligation to simultaneously ensure the right to freedom of thought and expression and the right to have one’s honor respected, as established by the Convention. 18. It is not a matter of categorizing these rights, as this would come into conflict with the Convention. The unitary and interdependent nature of rights would be confronted with the attempt to consider rights as being “first” or “second” category. What is relevant is defining the limits of each of these rights while seeking to reconcile them. Every fundamental right must be exercised with regard for other fundamental rights. In this reconcilement process, the State has a key role in trying to determine responsibilities and impose sanctions as may be necessary to achieve such purpose through the appropriate judicial mechanisms. IV. Legitimacy of the various judicial mechanisms protection of the right to have one’s honor respected for the 19. In this judgment the Court has dismissed the dichotomy posed by civil/criminal proceedings as a divortium acquarum regarding the respect or lack of respect for the right to freedom of thought and expression in the exercise of the “subsequent liability” referred to in Article 13 of the Convention. Though in the instant case the Court has ruled that there has been an abusive use of the State’s punitive power, the Court has stated that “criminal proceedings are suitable as, by threatening to impose sanctions, they serve the purpose of preserving the legal right whose protection is sought; in other words, they may help achieve such purpose” (para 71). Even more, the Court emphasizes that the State must provide society with the mechanisms needed “to determine responsibilities and impose sanctions as may be necessary to achieve such purpose” (para. 75). 20. One of such possible judicial mechanisms are criminal proceedings, as the Court has clearly established that “it does not deem any criminal sanction regarding the right to inform or give one’s opinion to be contrary to the provisions of the Convention” (para. 78). Notwithstanding, it has established that the proportionality and reasonability principles are to be observed when stating that “…this possibility should be carefully analyzed, pondering the extreme seriousness of the conduct of the individual who expressed the opinion, the bad faith in which or the injurious purpose with which it was expressed, the characteristics of the unfair damage caused, and other information which shows the absolute necessity to resort to criminal proceedings in exceptional cases” (para. 78). 21. Given the need to simultaneously ensure the right to have one’s honor respected and the right to freedom of thought and expression, the Court has ruled that “… criminal proceedings should be resorted to where fundamental legal rights