3 moment and circumstances introduces rigorous restrictions - like that contained in Article 4(1) - creating obstacles to the reinstatement of the penalty and opening the way for the reconsideration of corresponding sentences. 8 Therefore, any interpretation of the Pact of San José on this subject must take into account the general inclination of the Treaty - the spirit, clearly manifested in the letter - and to assume, by this, the utmost rigor. This demands the strictest interpretation of the conventional norms that govern this area. It should be made clear, that the foregoing does not imply that the Convention in this case is to be interpreted so as to abolish the death penalty. This is not the intention of the Judgment or of my Concurring Opinion, both of which are directed solely at the terms by which the Convention regulates the matter and independent of any personal views held on a subject where it is admittedly difficult to maintain a neutral position for the purpose of the lege ferenda. 9 However, at the time of judicially applying a specific norm - in this case, the American Convention - it is important to follow the lege lata, as the Court has effectively done in carrying out its jurisdictional functions, and as I do in the present Opinion. Accordingly, I will not discuss the question of the death penalty's legitimacy and utility. 5. It is also important to observe that the conclusions reached in this case, as in others involving crimes that have been perpetrated on innocent persons and shocked society, do not suggest an indifference or lack of understanding of the need to act with rigor, energy, and efficiency in the fight against crime. The State has the duty - a principal obligation, nuclear, and essential - to provide its citizens with security and justice, which are seriously compromised when crime increases. In such circumstances, the very least which must be expressed is solidarity with the aggrieved society - in particular with the victims of the crimes - and support for the legitimate measures undertaken for its protection. It has often been shown that elimination of impunity and the consequent assurance of punishment would allow for further advances in the fight against crime rather than the mere imposition of harsher penalties. This idea of our forefathers continues in contemporary thinking. 10 8 Fourteen signatory States to the American Convention made explicit their desire that the death penalty be abolished, through a future additional Protocol to the Convention. Cf. Inter-American Conference on Human Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, Records and Documents, OAS/Ser. K/XVI/1.2, Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 467. The Court noted for the record, on another occasion, that Article 4 of the Pact of San José "reveals a clear tendency to restrict the scope of [the death] penalty both as far as its imposition and its application"; and that "[o]n this entire subject, the Convention adopts an approach that is clearly incremental in character. That is, without going so far as to abolish the death penalty, the Convention imposes restrictions designed to delimit strictly its application and scope, in order to reduce the application of the penalty to bring about its gradual disappearance." I/A Court H.R., Restrictions to the death penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A No. 3, paras. 52 and 57. 9 Antonio Beristáin states that the death penalty is "a radical issue" in criminal law; it influences the system as a whole and all the decisions taken in this respect. Cf. "Pro y contra de la muerte en la política contemporánea", in Cuestiones penales y criminológicas, Madrid, Reus, 1979, p. 579. 10 "It is not the cruelty of the penalties which is one of the greatest deterrents of crimes, rather it is their infallibility […] The certainty of the punishment […] will always have a greater impact than the fear of one more terrible, this coupled with the hope of impunity," as it was taught centuries ago, by the reformer César Beccaria, De los delitos y las penas, trad. Juan Antonio de las Casas, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1982, pp. 71-72. (translation of the Secretariat)