- 62 - participated in the previous day’s operation, 240 and also that (ii) the facts reveal a “lack of professionalism, owing to the deficient training and skills of the police.”241 According to the SCJN, “[t]he investigation reveals unprofessional police agents who, added to other factors present, behaved violently, and superior officers who failed to take measures to prevent this, or to ensure that the violence ceased once it erupted.”242 166. As revealed by this and other evidence, the Court notes that, contrary to the State’s arguments, its responsibility is not derived merely from a few acts of state agents who exceeded the scope of their authority. In this case, the State’s responsibility for the excessive use of force also arises from the failure of the authorities to prevent the violations: (i) by failing to regulate the use of force by its law enforcement personnel adequately;243 (ii) by not providing adequate training for the different police forces attached to one of the three levels of government – municipal, state and federal – to enable them to execute their task of maintaining public order with due professionalism and respect for the human rights of the civilians with whom they came into contact in this context;244 (iii) by planning the operation of May 4 with the participation of agents who could not be objective and without giving express and unequivocal instructions regarding the obligation to respect the human rights of protesters, passers-by and onlookers;245 (iv) during the operations, by not halting or taking action to address the abuses that were being committed, in order to supervise and monitor the situation and the use of force;246 (v) owing to the absence of mechanisms to control and verify the legitimacy of the use of force after the facts In this regard, the SCJN indicated that: “[i]t is logical to suppose that the consequent mood that such events naturally generate (frustration, courage, revenge, solidarity with the group) had an impact on the fact that they did not act in a calculated manner, but lost their objectivity when executing their task.” SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folio 31068). 240 241 SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folio 31070). 242 SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folio 31072). “Law enforcement officials must be adequately trained in facilitating assemblies. This training should include proper knowledge of the legal framework governing assemblies, techniques of crowd facilitation and management, human rights in the context of assemblies and the important role assemblies play in a democratic order. Training must include soft skills such as effective communication, negotiation and mediation allowing law enforcement officials to avoid escalation of violence and minimize conflict.” Cf. Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies of February 4, 2016, A/HRC/31/66, para. 42. 244 With regard to the sexual abuse, on this point the SCJN emphasized that, although “it was very difficult for the superior officers of the police to observe in real time while it was happening; […] what was reprehensible, and revealed lack of professionalism and efficacy due to lack of foresight, was that, aware of the magnitude of the operation, measures were not taken to prevent the perpetration of those conducts or to permit a record and testimony of what happened to be obtained.” SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folios 31199 and 31200). 245 In this regard, the SCJN underlined that: “[t]he said actions can be attributed to those who executed them, but they can also be attributed by omission to all those police agents, and their commanders and superior officers who, during the operations, exercised functions of supervision and control, and there were many of them. […] It is true, as some of the accused have argued that, at the time, a great deal was happening at the same time and in different places, and that a lot of this had taken place in a relatively short time; but, it is also true that, in an operation of this magnitude and sophistication, in which so many commanders and superior officers were looking on by air and land, it is incomprehensible and inexcusable that no action was taken to stop it.” Cf. SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folio 31197). 246