- 63 - occurred.247 Regarding the latter, it should be emphasized that the police abuse was shown on the television which was broadcasting live at the time of the facts and, furthermore, according to the security agencies themselves, at least during the operation of May 4, 2006, they were being supervised by land and air.248 167. Even though States enjoy a certain margin of discretion when evaluating the danger to public order for the purpose of ordering the use of force, this discretionality is not unlimited or unconditional, particularly in the case of assemblies, protests or demonstrations protected by Article 15 of the Convention.249 It is incumbent on the State to prove that it adopted the measures that were strictly necessary and proportionate to control the perceived danger to public order or to human rights, without unnecessarily restricting or violating the right to peaceful assembly of others.250 In this regard, the Court has already indicated that public safety cannot be based on a standard for the use of force that treats the civilian population as the enemy, but should consist in the protection and control of civilians. 251 168. Contrary to the foregoing, in this case, the actions of the law enforcement authorities were characterized by the indiscriminate and excessive use of force against anyone they assumed to be a protester. In this regard, both the CNDH and the SCJN concluded that the police agents applied indiscriminate use of force, without taking into account whether the people they were beating and detaining had taken part in wrongful acts or even in the protest itself. 252 As indicated by expert witness Maina Kiai, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, “the violations committed against the victims clearly occurred owing to the chaos created by the way in which the police handled the protest.”253. On this point, the SCJN concluded: “[t]he use of force by the State also entails obligations for the State once the operation has ended. There is no evidence that, in this case, the State complied with these obligations. It is evident that the State did provide information on the execution of the operations in response to the requests for information made by this court and also the National Human Rights Commission, describing the details, personnel and equipment used in the operation. However, beyond this, there is no evidence that it has carried out a self-assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of the operations and, above all, there is no evidence that it has complied with the obligation to hold people accountable for the violations that occurred; […] these obligations, which are compulsory after the use of force, have not been observed in this case.” SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folios 31201 and 31202). 247 In this regard, “[t]he Head of the Security Agency confirmed [to the SCJN] that the operation was supervised on land and by air by the superiors of those who were executing it. However, nothing allows it to be noted that, when the detentions began, accompanied by the physical assaults indicated (some, even captured on live television), the said superiors took measures to ensure that this ceased. It is true, as some of the accused argue, that at the time a great deal was happening at the same time and in different places, and that a lot of this had taken place in a relatively short time; but, it is also true that, in an operation of this magnitude and sophistication, in which so many commanders and superior officers were looking on by air and land, it is incomprehensible and inexcusable that no action was taken to stop it.” SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folio 31197). 248 Even though it is evident that law enforcement agents have a margin of discretion when deciding on the appropriate response to a specific situation, they should take into account that the use of force is an extreme measure of an exceptional nature; consequently, it “shall not be used unless it is strictly unavoidable, and if applied it must be done in accordance with international human rights law.” Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies of February 4, 2016, A/HRC/31/66, p. 12). 249 250 See, similarly, ECHR, Case of Frumkin v. Russia, No. 74568/12. Judgment of January 5, 2016, paras. 99 and 137. Cf. Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006, Series C No. 150, para. 78. 251 Cf. SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folios 31254 and 31306), and CNDH Recommendation No. 38/2006 of October 16, 2006 (evidence file, folios 28523 and 28524). 252 Expert opinion provided by affidavit by Maina Kiai, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, on October 31, 2017 (evidence file, folio 37344). 253