23 prevent, prosecute and punish the deprivation of life as a result of criminal acts in general, but also to prevent arbitrary executions by its own security agents.12 67. In relation to the violation of Article 16 of the American Convention alluded to by the representatives (supra paras. 19 and 22), for which the State acknowledged its international responsibility (supra para. 20), this Court, bearing in mind, its responsibility to protect human rights, considers that the extrajudicial execution of Pedro Huilca Tecse, in the context of this case, constitutes a violation of the contents of the right to freedom of association, in relation to trade union rights. 68. As established above (supra para. 64), the murder of the alleged victim was motivated by his being a trade union leader who opposed and criticized the policies of the Government at that time. 69. Article 16(1) of the Convention includes the “right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.” These words establish literally that those who are protected by the Convention not only have the right and freedom to associate freely with other persons, without the interference of the public authorities limiting or obstructing the exercise of the respective right, which thus represents a right of each individual; but they also enjoy the right and freedom to seek the common achievement of a licit goal, without pressure or interference that could alter or change their purpose.13 Therefore, the execution of a trade union leader, in a context such as that of this case, not only restricts the freedom of association of an individual, but also the right and freedom of a determined group to associate freely, without fear; consequently, the right protected by Article 16 has a special scope and nature, and this illustrates the two dimensions of freedom of association.14 70. In its individual dimension, labor-related freedom of association is not exhausted by the theoretical recognition of the right to form trade unions, but also corresponds, inseparably, to the right to use any appropriate means to exercise this freedom. When the Convention proclaims that freedom of association includes the right to freely associate “for [… any] other purposes,” it is emphasizing that the freedom to associate and to pursue certain collective goals are indivisible, so that a limitation of the possibilities of association represents directly, and to the same extent, a limitation of the right of the collectivity to achieve its proposed purposes. Hence the importance of adapting to the Convention the legal regime applicable to trade unions and the State’s actions, or those that occur with it tolerance, that could render this right inoperative in the practice 71. In its social dimension, freedom of association is a mechanism that allows the members of a labor collectivity or group to achieve certain objectives together and to obtain benefits for themselves. 12 Cf. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers, supra note 7, para. 129; Case of Myrna Mack Chang, supra note 4, para. 153; and Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 11, para. 110. 13 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al.. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C. No. 72, paras. 156 and 159. 14 Cf. mutatis mutandis, Case of Herrera Ulloa. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 108; and Compulsory Membership in an Association prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para. 30 and 70.