21 clandestine detention, from which they could escape alive only if they were very lucky.14 54.4. In cases of forced disappearance, breaking into the victims’ residence with violence was the detention modality mostly used. These break-ins were usually carried out by patrols of ten or more persons wearing balaclavas, black turtle-neck pullovers, pants and dark boots. The break-ins would take place late at night while the victims and their next of kin were asleep. The use of flashlights, short guns, long guns and official vehicles was usual in this type of operations.15 b) The “Colina Group” 54.5. In 1991, military and political high command officers then holding office agreed that their Intelligence Operation Agents (IOA) reporting to the Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército (SIE) (Army Intelligence Service) should form a commando reporting to the Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército (DINTE) (Army Intelligence Bureau), which became known as the “Colina Group.” 16 54.6. The so-called “Colina Group,” composed by members of the Peruvian Army, was probably one of the best known units specialized in forced disappearances and arbitrary executions. This group was created as part of the strategies used to confront terrorism by the then recently established administration of President Fujimori. The Colina Group, reporting to the Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército (SIE) (Army Intelligence Service), was “created, organized and directed from the heart of the Presidency of the Republic and the Army Command.”17 This unit was in charge of operations specially designed to identify, control and eliminate members of subversive organizations or their followers and/or collaborators, by means of indiscriminate extrajudicial executions, collective assassinations, forced 18 disappearances and torture. 14 Cf. Report by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru) signed on August 27, 2003, in the city of Lima, Peru, (Appendixes to the brief of requests and arguments, Appendix 13), and report rendered before an official whose acts command full faith and credit (affidavit) by the expert Sofía Macher, on September 2, 2005 (file on the merits, reparations and costs, Volume II, pages 520 to 548). 15 Cf. Report by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru) signed on August 27, 2003, in the city of Lima, Peru, (Appendixes to the brief of requests and arguments, Appendix 13), and report rendered before an official whose acts command full faith and credit (affidavit) by the expert Sofía Macher, on September 2, 2005 (file on the merits, reparations and costs, Volume II, pages 520 to 548). 16 Cf. Report by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru) signed on August 27, 2003, in the city of Lima, Peru, (Appendixes to the brief of requests and arguments, Appendix 13), and report rendered before an official whose acts command full faith and credit (affidavit) by the expert Sofía Macher, on September 2, 2005 (file on the merits, reparations and costs, Volume II, pages 520 to 548). 17 Facts alleged by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in its application of September 13, 2004, pages 23 and 25, which were not contested by the State. 18 Cf. Report by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru) signed on August 27, 2003, in the city of Lima, Peru, (Appendixes to the brief of requests and arguments, Appendix 13), and report rendered before an official whose acts command full