32 124. In the present case, the petitioners allege that the State did not initiate an investigation ex oficio, but that it carried one out upon the initiative of a private party. They add that the investigation did not take place with due diligence, which is why the events are still subject to impunity and the victim has not received reparations that are proportionate to the seriousness of the after effects of the torture that he has suffered. They state specifically that the authorities charged with investigating the facts did not apply the Protocol of Medical-legal Recognition for the Detection of Injuries or Death as a result of Torture,” nor did they apply the Protocol of Istanbul. 125. For its part, the State reported that in the year 2007, it reformed its police-military jurisdiction to adapt it to the principles contained in the Constitution and the American Convention, and that the proceeding was sent from the military to the civil courts. It alleges that on October 17, 2008 it definitively closed the complaint because it was impossible to obtain the statement of Mr. Quispealaya, whose whereabouts were unknown, and that furthermore, it was necessary to establish the period of disability and the medical attention required, and no medical certificate to this effect was created. The State alleges that if Mr. Quispealaya had not agreed with the resolution to close the case, he could have presented an appeal, but he did not do so. Reasonable time period 126. With regard to the reasonable time period contemplated in Article 8(1) of the American Convention, the Inter-American Court has established that three elements must be taken into account to determine the reasonability of the period in which the proceedings are carried out: 1) the complexity of the matter, b) the interested party’s procedural activities, and c) the conduct of the judicial authorities. 115 127. The Commission considers that the matter in question was not complex, given that the allegations that Mr. Quispealaya consistently made occurred in plain daylight and before numerous witnesses, and because the case file contains several medical certificates that indicate that Mr. Quispealaya lost the vision in his right eye as a result of a traumatic injury. Additionally, the IACHR observes that at the moment when Mr. Quispealaya enlisted in the military service, a medical examination to determine his physical and psychological fitness demonstrated that he was fit for service. 128. With regard to the interested party’s procedural activities, the Commission observes that the petitioners had to report the events to the Public Prosecutor on February 28, 2002, that is, more than a year and a month after the events had occurred, and more than seven months after Dr. Chang informed the Brigade General of the events. This is despite the Peruvian State’s duty to initiate an investigation ex oficio, without delay and in a serious, impartial and effective manner, once it becomes aware of the events. The Commission observes, similarly, that Mr. Quispealaya submitted to the medical examinations requested by the authorities and presented a motion for change of jurisdiction in which he requested that the case be removed from the military jurisdiction on November 30, 2004, which was resolved on May 12, 2005 by the Permanent Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in favor of the private military courts. 115 I/A Ct. H.R.. Case of Vargas Areco V. Paraguay. Judgment of 26 September 2006. Series C No. 155, para. 196; Case of de las Masacres de Ituango V. Colombia. Judgment of 1 July 2006 Series C No. 148, para. 289; y I/A Ct. H.R.. Case of Baldeón García V. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 6 April 2006. Series C No. 147, para. 151.