25 the Supreme Council of Military Justice, in the absence of the Examining Magistrate of this body. 69. In his declaration, this official stated that the alleged victim falls under the competence of the jurisdictional organ of the special Military Justice System, since he has a military rank, because, according to Article one hundred and seventy-four of the Constitution, military ranks are for life and can only be withdrawn from their holders by a judicial decision[;] consequently, the retired officer in question may not allege threat or violation of his personal liberty. Moreover, he stated that if the defendant considered that the military justice system was not competent to judge him, he had the right to file a jurisdictional dispute that would be decided by the Supreme Court. 70. On February 4, 1997, the Judge of the Thirtieth Criminal Court of Lima declared the petition for habeas corpus filed by Gustavo Cesti Hurtado without merit, considering that it could not be invoked in an ordinary proceeding and that the arguments on the incompetence of the military justice system should be settled “in another type of defense measure related to jurisdiction”. Gustavo Cesti Hurtado appealed this decision on February 5, 1997, when he made the following declaration: I am not referring to irregularities within the proceeding BUT TO AN IRREGULAR PROCEEDING, which consisted in submitting me to the military justice system, although I am RETIRED, when Article 173 of the Constitution establishes that member of the armed forces are prosecuted under this jurisdiction for service-related crimes. As a retired member of the armed forces, I have no service-related responsibilities (Article 53 of Legislative Decree 752) and only those who are on active service or in reserve may be submitted to the military justice system (the aforementioned Legislative Decree 752 or the Law on Military Status). Therefore, it is not with appeals or with pleas as to the jurisdiction of the court that the imminent danger of my arrest by an incompetent jurisdiction can be remedied. 71. On February 12, 1997, the Public Law Chamber, in decision No. 97, revoked the appealed decision and upheld the petition for habeas corpus filed by Gustavo Cesti Hurtado. The Public Law Chamber based its decision on the following reasoning, among others: […] according to the provisions of Article 173 of the Political Constitution of Peru, in cases of service-related crime, members of the Armed Forces are submitted to the Code of Military Justice and to the respective jurisdiction, while civilians are excluded from this jurisdiction, except in cases of terrorism and high treason, which is not the present case. Therefore, constitutional law essentially contains two conjunctive and inseparably interrelated presumptions which will determine submission to special jurisdiction, and these are: a) the subject is an active member of the armed forces and b) the military fact; SEVENTH: In order to consider whether both presumptions exist, we should recall that constitutional law makes special reference to the type of function that the person on active duty exercises and that, it is as a consequence of this that a crime typified in the Code of Military Justice occurs. This means that, of necessity, the said person must be carrying out functions as set forth in Article 321 of the Code of Military Justice; […] NINTH: Consequently, we can determine that in order to submit a person to the military justice system there must be a linking fact directly related to the person under investigation, that is, the military fact that is imputed or that also implies disrespect for the dignity of the Armed Forces; TENTH: In the present case, the status of the petitioner Gustavo Adolfo Cesti Hurtado as an officer with the rank of retired Peruvian Army Captain has been proved. Therefore, according to the analytical and comparative study of the elements examined, his participation in the facts which are the subject of the action filed under the military justice system are of an ordinary substantive type. Consequently, in view of the personal status and the substantive type which have been determined, it follows that this civilian cannot be submitted to a special proceeding