32 111. The State declared that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Gustavo Cesti Hurtado had been malicious, because he knew that the law regulating this action “only allows it to be filed against an arbitrary arrest, and not when the arrest is the consequence of a motivated judicial order emanating from an ordinary proceeding”, such as the one filed against him. Furthermore, the State asserted that the favorable decision issued by the Public Law Chamber in the habeas corpus procedure was “illegal, non-executable and null ipso jure”. According to the State, this argument is confirmed by the fact that the judges who comprise that body were sanctioned for their decision. 112. Moreover, the State declared that when the petition for habeas corps “concluded”, the provisional order of arrest had been “subsumed” by the judgment pronounced by the military justice system and that, in no way, can it be said that this protective measure invalidates the effects of a sentence imposed in judgment. 113. Lastly, the State asserted that, according to constitutional provisions, the petition for habeas corpus is not appropriate to protect the right “not to be changed from a predetermined jurisdiction or from the principle of the judge with general jurisdiction”, since such guarantees may only be protected by filing a writ of amparo. 114. The plaintiff would not have obtained his freedom by this action, but rather the proceeding would have been sent to the competent jurisdiction or “measures to challenge jurisdiction” would have been proposed to him. According to the State’s argument, Gustavo Cesti Hurtado had not filed a writ of amparo because, by this means “it was not possible to order… freedom; however, freedom can be ordered with a writ of habeas corpus”. 115. Peru added that “it is unthinkable to establish the dangerous precedent that a preventive order of arrest can be invalidated for reasons of jurisdiction, by considering that it has been issued by an incompetent organ”. 116. In its final arguments, the Commission maintained that the Peruvian State had not respected its international obligations, since the military authorities did not comply with the writ of habeas corpus. This lack of compliance violated the effective judicial protection embodied in Article 25 of the Convention, which establishes the obligation to ensure that the competent authorities shall apply any remedy when granted. 117. The Commission added that the Convention is violated if a remedy is not binding on the authorities or if it is subordinated to procedural requirements that make it inapplicable, such as in the case of a jurisdictional dispute. It also stated that “[t]he principles of judicial protection and procedural legality include not only the right to the execution of final judgment but also respect for the finality of such judgments and the inviolability of the juridical situations that they determine, because if the substantive issue should be disregarded, whatever was finally decided at the end of the proceeding would also be rendered ineffective. 118. In its final arguments, the State contended that the habeas corpus decision in favor of Gustavo Cesti Hurtado was “illegal, contradictory, invalid”. It stated that, in the instant case, habeas corpus was not in order in view of the express provisions of the Law of Habeas Corpus and Amparo No. 23,506 and the complementary Law No. 25,398, which prohibit – or at least declare the illegality of the petition for habeas corpus in this type of case. The State alleged that if anyone issues an illegal