34 this protection is stipulated in Peruvian legislation, which states that its aim is “to revert matters to the situation before the violation or threat of violation of a constitutional right”. 124. The Court has also verified that Peruvian legislation accepts that the petition for habeas corpus may be filed against acts of judicial authorities, except if they are the result of an ordinary proceedings. The legal exception referring to “ordinary proceedings” should not be interpreted to mean that there is an impediment to filing protective measures against any type of judicial decision, since such an interpretation would contradict the provisions of the Peruvian Constitution itself, in Article 200.1, which states that the petition for habeas corpus is in order against any authority, official or person who violates or threatens personal liberty or related constitutional rights. 125. This Court shares the opinion of the Commission that the right established in Article 7.6 of the American Convention is not complied with merely by the formal existence of the recourses that it stipulates. Such recourses must be effective because, according to Article 7.6, their purpose is to obtain a prompt decision “about the legality [of the] arrest or [the] detention” and, should these have been illegal, the execution of an order of liberty, also without delay. Moreover, the Court has declared that the absence of an effective remedy to violations of the rights recognized by the Convention is itself a violation of the Convention by the State Party in which the remedy is lacking. In that sense, it should be emphasized that, for such a remedy to exist, it is not sufficient that it be provided for by the Constitution or by law or that it be formally recognized, but rather it must be truly effective in establishing whether there has been a violation of human rights and in providing redress. A remedy that proves illusory because of the general, conditions prevailing in the country, or even in the particular circumstances of a given case, cannot be considered effective. That could be the case, for example, when practice has shown its ineffectiveness: when the Judicial Power lacks the necessary independence to render impartial decisions or the means to carry out its judgments30. 126. The Court considers that it has been demonstrated that the petition for habeas corpus, as it exists in Peruvian law, meets the requirements established in Article 25 of the Convention, because it clearly constitutes “a simple and prompt recourse [...] against acts that violate [the] fundamental rights” of the petitioner. Moreover, Peru is one of the countries “whose laws establish that anyone who is threatened with being deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to have recourse to a competent judge or tribunal in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat”, in the words of Article 7.6 of the Convention. 127. There is no dispute that when Gustavo Cesti Hurtado tried to make use of this remedy, there was an objective threat to his liberty in the form of an accusation pending against him under military justice. The Court may also suppose that, when the Public Law Chamber adopted its decision in favor of the petition for habeas corpus filed by Gustavo Cesti Hurtado on February 12, 1997, it took into consideration the allegations made by the Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Military Justice on February 3, 1997, that the plaintiff had been included “under 30. Judicial guarantees in states of emergency (Articles. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9.