originates from a rule established in advance of the proceeding,80 and correlatively, that rule is broken when the disciplinary body lacks the competence recognized by law.81 47. The Commission considers that only a transparent designation process, based on objective criteria and that guarantees the equality of all the candidates, is a fundamental guarantee for the independence of the judiciary.82 Precisely in light of the important function performed by the organs entrusted with the processes of appointment, promotion, and disciplinary sanctions, and the objectivity required for their activity, the Commission has considered that it is advisable for the states to establish an independent organ whose functions include the appointment, promotion, and removal of judges.83 48. In the instant case, the fact that the Constitution did not expressly grant the Legislative Assembly authority to remove or dismiss judges of the TSE is not in dispute Nor is it is in dispute that there were no regulations whatsoever governing the proceeding for disciplining members of that Tribunal. 49. To begin with, the Commission finds that the pronouncement of the Constitutional Division that considered that that power belonged to the authority that appointed them cannot itself substitute the law's function of offering, in advance of the proceeding in this particular case, the necessary legal certainty as regards foreknowledge of the competent authority and, therefore, the extent of said competency. The foregoing is even more significant considering that the case involved a punitive proceeding against a judge and bearing in mind the strengthened tenure that those who hold such an office enjoy in order to safeguard their independence. 50. The Commission considers that in this case, keeping in mind the principle of judicial independence, the interpretation of the Constitutional Division in the sense of according competence to the appointing authority is all the more troubling when one considers how judges of the TSE are appointed. Although the appointment process is not under examination in this case, which is confined to the removal from office of Mr. Colindres, the Commission cannot help but note the political and partisan influence in relation to three of the TSE's five members—one of them, the alleged victim. 51. Taking into account that Mr. Colindres was elected from a political party's shortlist, the application by analogy of the powers and requirements related to his appointment to his removal from office essentially meant that what the Legislative Assembly debated in the proceeding it conducted were the contents of the judgments that he signed and whether or not they were favorable to the interests of a faction of his party that was then embroiled in a dispute. The Commission underscores that the principle of judicial independence entails that judges not be removed from office for their decisions (save in the event of some inexcusable error, which was not invoked in this case), the rationale for which must be challenged by the appropriate remedies against such decisions. 52. The Commission also finds that the lack of clarity with respect to the authority of the Assembly to remove members of the TSE from office was denoted not only by the absence of regulations and by the information regarding the debates in the plenary of the Legislative Assembly—in which deputies explained that in the absence of regulatory provisions for the dismissal of certain officials (elected on the basis of the same rules as TSE judges) it was impossible to dismiss them until legal reforms were adopted (see footnote 35 above)—but also in the dissenting opinion of a member of the Constitutional Division (see footnote 51 above). 80Cf. I/A Court H.R., Case of Apitz-Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, par. 53. 81 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, par. 221. 82IACHR, 83See Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, 2009, par. 187. IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, par. 374. 13