26. Finally, the Commission has competence ratione materiae because the petition alleges violations of human rights protected in the American Convention and in the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. Other requirements for the admissibility of the petition a. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 27. The issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is addressed in Article 46(1)(a) and (b) of the American Convention. 28. The petitioners consider that domestic remedies were exhausted in Venezuela with the filing of the writ of habeas corpus on January 28, 2000, before the Fifth Circuit Court of the State of Vargas--which decided on February 1, 2000, that there was no subject matter on which to decide upon--and the affirmation of this decision on February 10, 2000, by the Court of Appeals for the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Judicial District for the State of Vargas. 29. The Venezuelan State alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies on August 24, 2000, considering that the petition before us is the subject of an active and ongoing investigation, through the constant holding of proceedings necessary to clear up the facts, by the Public Ministry and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, together with the Venezuelan courts. 30. In the instant case, the Commission observes that the writ of habeas corpus was rejected in the first instance on February 1, 2000, and that this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 10, 2001. While it is true that the State asserts that the victim’s next-ofkin have yet to exhaust the remedy of review, in the opinion of the Commission this remedy is not adequate for determining the whereabouts of the victim in the case of a forced disappearance. As the Honorable Court has pointed out from its first contentious cases: [H]abeas corpus would be the normal means of finding a person presumably detained by the authorities, of ascertaining whether he is legally detained and, given the case, of obtaining his liberty. 2 31. The Venezuelan State also argues that Senior Prosecutor for the State of Vargas was told to immediately order that the respective inquiries begin, “which means that with that decision, domestic remedies were not exhausted, but rather it was necessary to pursue those indicated by the court.” The Commission attributes importance to the work being done by the State to identify the persons responsible for the facts that are the subject matter of this case, since, in effect, a criminal trial is the appropriate proceeding for this purpose. Nonetheless, as the Court has indicated: “The purpose of habeas corpus is not only to guarantee personal liberty and humane treatment, but also to prevent disappearance or failure to determine the place of detention, and, ultimately, to ensure the right to life.”3 Bearing in mind that the alleged victim disappeared December 21, 1999, the Commission considers that the State has had more than reasonable time to determine the whereabouts of Oscar José Blanco Romero. In addition, the Commission must state that once the habeas corpus is denied in the first instance and on appeal, by the Judiciary, domestic remedies have been fully exhausted. As indicated by Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, to which Venezuela is a state party, “the right [of a victim] to expeditious and effective judicial procedures and recourse shall be retained as a means of determining the whereabouts or state of health of a person who has been deprived of freedom, or of identifying the official who ordered or carried out such deprivation of freedom.” One year and nine months have passed, and the alleged victim remains disappeared. 32. With respect to what the State has indicated to the effect that the next-of-kin must exhaust the criminal proceeding under way, the Commission must reiterate its doctrine according to which: 2 3 I/A Court HR, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C, No. 4, para. 65. I/A Court HR, Case of Castillo Páez, Judgment on the merits, para. 83. 6