placed with the State. The Commission therefore believes that it is competent ratione personae. 32. The Commission is competent ratione materiae in that the petition alleges violations by the State of human rights of the alleged victims that are protected by the American Convention. 33. The Commission is competent ratione temporis, since the alleged incidents in the petition occurred when the obligation of respecting and ensuring the rights protected by the American Convention was already in force for the State. 34. The Commission is competent ratione loci to hear the petition since it alleges violations of rights protected by the American Convention occurring within the territory of a state party thereto. C. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 35. Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention states that for a petition to be admissible, the remedies available under the State’s domestic jurisdiction must first have been exhausted. 36. In the case, the petitioner claims that alleged victims were denied effective access to justice under domestic jurisdiction. He alleges negligence, omissions, and delay tactics by both the Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigation Corps and the Public Prosecution Service, which alone is empowered to begin investigations and pursue criminal proceedings for crimes defined as publicly actionable. The petitioner claims that more than a year after the incident that gave rise to the complaint, a serious investigation into the reported crimes committed against the alleged victims has yet to commence. 37. The Commission and the Court have repeatedly insisted on their status as “reinforcing or complementary” bodies15 within the inter-American system for the protection of human rights,16 and this situation is reflected in Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, which allows the states parties to resolve cases within their own legal frameworks before it becomes necessary to resort to international proceedings. 38. Article 31(3) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure stipulates that when a petitioner claims he is unable to exhaust domestic remedies, it falls to the state to demonstrate that certain internal remedies still offer an effective solution for the harm allegedly suffered. Nevertheless, the state may waive, either explicitly or tacitly, its right to argue that domestic remedies have not been exhausted. Specifically, if it fails to send a response to the petition within the allotted time, providing therewith its arguments vis-à-vis the exhaustion of domestic remedies, then that failure constitutes a tacit waiver of the right to ague that they have not been exhausted.17 In the instant case, the petition was conveyed to the State on August 19, 2004, at which time it was granted a period of two months in which to respond. As of the date of this report, the State has offered no comments and has therefore tacitly waived its right to argue the nonexhaustion of domestic remedies. D. Filing Period 39. In reference to the present petition, the IACHR has concluded that the State of Venezuela tacitly waived its right to argue the nonexhaustion of domestic remedies, and so Article 46(1)(b) of the American Convention is not applicable. That notwithstanding, the provisions of 15 American Convention on Human Rights, Preamble, paragraph 2. 16 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Honduras), Series C Nº 4, Judgment of July 29, 1988, paragraph 61. 17 IACHR, Report Nº 31/031, Case 12.195, Admissibility, Mario Alberto Jara Oñate et al., Chile, March 7, 2003, paragraph 35; Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 1, 2000. 7