20 compensation, because, since the victim did not have a regular income, it cannot be adduced that all the other persons were financially dependent on him; as this was inferred in the judgment, it was merely an opinion of the Court without any legal basis”; e) The concept of “injured party” was not properly defined in the judgment, because not only was the status of beneficiaries of reparations established for the victim’s successors, but also “for relatives who cannot be considered thus.” In any case, “none of those who are considered to be relatives of the victim would be exempt from the need to prove their identity and their relationship with the victim[, since i[n] the instant case, the victim and the members of his family who have the right to succession live in a village with access to the Municipality of Colomoncag[u]a, where there is a Registry Office”; f) “Over and above the principles included in the general rule on succession, it may be established exceptionally that, in addition to the victim’s successors, compensation should also be extended to those who have had a dependent relationship with the victim.” Regarding the victim’s companions, “according to the law, this right would only correspond to the concubine with whom he was actually living, and not to the previous ones, who could be legally ineligible to succeed.” In the judgment, the benefit of compensation is granted to two companions of the victim, and the Court has not specified the rules governing this decision; g) Juan José Vijil, who, together with the victim’s mother, is the beneficiary of compensation of US$8,200.00 (eight thousand two hundred United States dollars) for expenditures relating to the search, medical expenses and travel, “is not related in any way to [Juan Humberto] Sánchez; [a relationship] by affinity could be presumed, if he had been married to the latter’s mother, but this has not been proved [...], nor has it be proved that he was financial dependent” on Juan Humberto Sánchez; h) Likewise, the judgment established payment of compensation in favor of the sisters of Juan Humberto Sánchez, “when his only beneficiaries or successors are his minor children; according to the State’s domestic legislation and [to] the rules of succession, wives only have a right to the conjugal quarter part, and parents, only when they have no resources, [which] has not been [...] proved, to a quarter part”; and i) The Court ordered that the compensation for non-pecuniary damage corresponding to Juan Humberto Sánchez should be distributed not only among his daughters, “the sole successors,” but also among his companions and his parents, although “Juan José Vijil Hernández was not [a parent].” Likewise, payment of compensation for nonpecuniary damage caused directly to them was also ordered to Vijil Hernández, as well as “to other relatives [of the victim], who did not form part of his household.” Arguments of the Commission