21 51. The Commission stated that “it consider[ed] the questioning [of reparations] inadmissible, because [this does not constitute the purpose] of a request for interpretation.” However, it made the following observations on this point: a) The State’s argument that the compensation imposed by the Court is “discretional and arbitrary” is a direct questioning of the content of the judgment, which is contrary to the definition of the figure of interpretation of judgment established in the Convention. Regarding the amount of the compensation, the criteria used by the Court for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages “are abundant and absolutely clear” and are included in paragraphs 158 to 178 of the judgment. In this respect, “it is plain that, in its request, the State did not assert a doubt to be clarified in the terms of Article 68(1) of the Convention, but an evident disagreement about the amounts established by the Court and, with regard to which, it is basically seeking a modification using a mechanism that is not contemplated by the American Convention, and which should be rejected summarily” by the Court; b) The State’s procedural objection based on the merging of the stages of the proceeding before the Court “disregards one of the central objectives of the [...] latest reform of the Rules of Procedure of [the Court], which consists in ensuring greater promptness and flexibility to the proceeding[, …] and which establishes as a general principle that the Court shall rule [...] on the merits of the case and also on reparations and costs in the same judgment”; c) The Rules of Procedure of the Court, contrary to those of the Commission, do not include a special procedure for the negotiation of a friendly settlement between the parties, but recognize their capacity to agree on a friendly settlement and, should they reach an agreement, authorize the Court to strike the case from its list, in accordance with Article 53 of the Rules of Procedure; d) “The purpose of compensation is to achieve the reparation or restitutio in integrum of the damage effectively suffered owing to the fact that violated the human rights” and, in this respect, Article 63(1) of the American Convention establishes “ample discretion with regard to reparation, which is not subject to procedural analyses or to limitations as regards the relationship with the victim of those who have effectively been affected”; e) Consequently, the Court considered that the expression “next of kin of the victim” should be understood as a broad concept encompassing all those persons connected by a close relationship, who could have the right to receive compensation, without considering domestic law in this sphere. The interpretation of this norm has allowed the Court to include companions or any other person in this category, according to the circumstances of the case; and f) No interpretation is necessary as regards the persons against whom the violations were committed or the criteria for determining the beneficiaries of the reparations “in view of the manifest clarity” of paragraphs 155 and 156 of the Court’s judgment on this point.