30 human rights,62 and would deprive all the beneficiaries of the Convention of the guarantee of protection of those rights by the actions of its jurisdictional body, and the consequent execution of the latter’s decisions. Allowing States to comply with the reparations ordered in the judgments without adequate monitoring would be equal to leaving the execution of the Court’s decisions to their free will. 96. As the Court has indicated in the Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein cases63 the American Convention and other human rights treaties are inspired in superior common values (focused on the protection of the individual), are provided with specific monitoring mechanisms, are applied in accordance with the notion of collective guarantee, embody obligations of an essential objective character, and have a special nature distinguishing them from other treaties, which regulate reciprocal interests of States Parties. 97. In this respect, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), stated that “in this type of treaty, the contracting States do not have their own interests; they only have an overall common interest: to attain the purposes that are the raison d’etre of the Convention.”64 98. The European Court of Human Rights and the former European Commission on Human Rights, have also ruled similarly. In Austria v. Italy (1961), the European Commission stated that the obligations assumed by the States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights “are essentially of an objective character, designed to protect the fundamental rights of human being from violations by the High Contracting Parties.”65 Similarly, in Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978), the European Court stated that: [… u]nlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’.66 Likewise, in Soering v. United Kingdom (1989), with regard to the European Convention, the European Court declared that “[i]n interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms […]. Thus, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings 62 Cf. Cantos case. Preliminary objections. Judgment of September 7, 2001. Series C No. 85, para. 37; Constantine et al. case. Preliminary objections, supra note 39, paras. 75 and 86; and Benjamin et al. case. Preliminary objections, supra note 39, para. 86. 63 Cf. The Constitutional Court case. Competence, supra note 35, para. 41; and Ivcher Bronstein case. Competence, supra note 35, para. 42. 64 Cf. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23. 65 European Commission of Human Rights, Austria vs. Italy, Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 788/60, European Yearbook of Human Rights, vol. 4, 1961, p. 140. 66 Ireland v. the United Kingdom (Merits and just satisfaction), judgment of 18 January 1978, ECHR, Series A no. 25, p. 90, para. 239.