40 119. On November 22, 2002, the Court issued a second order on compliance with judgment (supra para. 21), based on the examination of the information presented by the State and the comments submitted by the victims or their legal representatives and by the Inter-American Commission. In this order, the Court confirmed that the State had complied with the obligation stipulated in the ninth operative paragraph of the judgment. It also indicated certain general guidelines in order to resolve issues relating to the execution of the measures of reparation ordered in the judgment, with regard to which there was a dispute between the parties, and requested the State to present another report by June 30, 2003, at the latest, on the progress made in complying with the reparations so that the Court would have information to assess the degree of compliance with the judgment of February 2, 2001. Among the general guidelines for the execution of the measures of reparation, the Court referred to the determination of labor rights by the State in order to comply with the sixth operative paragraph and to the procedure for the execution of the provisions of the seventh operative paragraph of this judgment, which should be carried out “observing the guarantees of due process of law and according to the legislation applicable to each victim,” as had been ordered in the judgment of February 2, 2001.98 120. It was following this second order that the State, in a brief of February 27, 2003, (supra para. 26), first questioned the Court’s competence to monitor compliance with its judgments. In this brief, Panama expressed its disagreement with the decisions of the Court in the Order of November 22, 2002, and indicated that the stage of monitoring compliance with judgment was a “post-judgment” stage, that “was not included in the norms that regulate the jurisdiction and procedure of the Court” and that, by issuing that order, the Court had interpreted its judgment of February 2, 2001. Similarly, it presented a brief on July 30, 2003, (supra paras. 41 and 54), in which it once again questioned the Court’s competence to monitor compliance with its judgments. 121. The Court observes that the State first questioned its competence to monitor compliance with its judgments more than two years after the Court had delivered the judgment on merits and reparations and costs – in which it stated that it would monitor compliance with the judgment. Since that judgment was rendered, Panama has presented 14 briefs on compliance with that decision to the Court (supra paras. 4, 13, 14, 26, 35, 39 and 41), in which it has kept the Court informed about the different measures taken in order to comply with this judgment of the Court. Likewise, the State has manifested “its intention to comply with the judgment of February 2, 2001.” After the Court had issued a second order, in which it referred to the general parameters that the State should respect when complying with the reparations ordered in this case, Panama questioned the Court’s competence to monitor compliance with its decisions. However, it in no way questioned the first order issued by the Court. 122. Even though Panama submitted two briefs (supra paras. 26, 41, 53 and 54) in which it contested the Court’s competence to monitor compliance with its judgments, in these same briefs, the State informed the Court about different measures taken to comply with the decisions of the Court. 98 Cf. Baena Ricardo et al. case. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, paras. 125, 204, 205 and sixth and seventh operative paragraphs; and Baena Ricardo et al. case. Compliance with judgment. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 22, 2002, sixth, seventh and ninth considering paragraphs, and first and second operative paragraphs.