42 tenth operative paragraph of this judgment “it decided[d] that it [would] supervise compliance with th[e] judgment [...].” 126. After examining the measures taken by the State in its different briefs, the Court concludes the following: a) although it had the authority to request an interpretation of the judgment, owing to disagreement on the meaning and scope of the provisions relating to the Court’s competence to monitor compliance with the judgment, the State did not use the procedural measures established in Article 67 of the Convention; b) the State presented numerous reports on compliance with the judgment; c) the State did not contest the first order issued by the Court on compliance with the judgment of June 21, 2002 (supra para. 12); d) the constant conduct of the State implied a recognition of the Court’s authority to monitor compliance with the judgment on merits and reparations and costs delivered in this case; e) Panama only contested the Court’s authority to monitor compliance with its judgments after the Court issued a second order on compliance with judgment on November 22, 2002. It is worth emphasizing that this occurred two years after delivery of the judgment on merits and reparations and costs in the case; and f) despite questioning the Court’s monitoring function, the State has continued to provide the Court with information on the measures taken to comply with its judgment, which reveals its recognition of the Court’s competence to monitor compliance with its decisions. 127. In conclusion, the Court considers that there is no doubt that the State’s conduct reveals that it recognized the Court’s competence to monitor compliance with its decisions, and, in consequence, it has behaved thus during almost all the monitoring procedure. IV CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT 128. The Court, like any body with jurisdictional functions, has the authority, inherent in its attributions, to determine the scope of its own competence, and also of its orders and judgments, and compliance with the latter cannot be left to the discretion of the parties, because it would be inadmissible to subordinate the mechanism established in the American Convention to restrictions that make the Court’s function and, consequently, that of the human rights protection system embodied in the Convention inoperable.99 129. Monitoring compliance with judgments is one of the elements of jurisdiction. The effectiveness of the judgments depends on compliance with them. 130. Likewise, compliance with the decisions and judgments should be considered an integral part of the right of access to justice, understood it is broadest sense. The contrary would presume the very denial of this right. If the responsible State 99 Cf. Luis Uzcátegui case. Provisional Measures. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of February 20, 2003, thirteenth considering paragraph; Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. case, supra note 39, para. 19; Constantine et al. case. Preliminary objections, supra note 39, para. 73; Benjamin et al. case. Preliminary objections, supra note 39, para. 73; and Hilaire case. Preliminary objections, supra note 39, para. 82.