15 i) From Article 65 of the Convention, it can be inferred that the Court has competence to require the parties in a case to provide information on compliance with the judgments, and also to rule on this compliance; j) “It did not share the interpretation of the State, according to which, Article 65 of the Convention merely grants obligations of an administrative nature to the Court.” The inter-American protection system “does not consider, as in the case of the European system and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), that a political body should monitor compliance with the judgments of the Court.” Moreover, the Convention does not indicate that the OAS General Assembly will supervise execution of the Court’s judgments. The Court informs the said Assembly of non-compliance with its decisions by of a State, so that the Assembly “may take measures to insist on compliance”; k) The Court has competence to monitor compliance, “taking decisions” and can also “issue obligatory orders in that respect and, subsequently, in cases in which such orders are not respected, inform the General Assembly of this non-compliance and recommend actions”; l) The court of appeal of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicated that it had competence to determine whether “a State complied or not” with its decisions, “in order to then inform the UN Security Council of this non-compliance.” The “Tribunal indicated that this determination was an essential stage of the proceedings”20; m) It reiterated that Article 65 of the Convention “confirms the competence of the Court to issue resolutions on compliance, that this competence is not only embodied in the Convention, but has also been an extended and constant practice of the Court itself”; n) “When the Court determines the international responsibility of a State for violations of the Convention, the State must comply with the judgment of the Court and ensure reparations to the victims”; and o) The “Court is competent to issue orders on compliance and [...] what it orders is perfectly compatible with its competence to monitor compliance with its decisions. Therefore, the doctrine of excès de pouvoir invoked by the State[,] applicable when a tribunal acts without having competence for such an act, is totally inapplicable.” 56. In its comments (supra paras. 29 and 50) on the briefs of the State of February 27 and June 30, 2003, (supra paras. 26 and 41), CEJIL, the legal representative of most of the victims, indicated, inter alia, that: a) The position of the State reveals a substantial lack of awareness of inter-American law; 20 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Request of The Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 29 October 1997, para. 33 et seq.