route, which prompted an aggressive reaction from the community members, to which the soldiers responded with criminal disproportion. However, the route itself was illustrative of the persistent military mindset, which identifies refugees and returnees with guerrillas. At the same time, the CEH considers that this case illustrates the degree to which, even in the years after the armed confrontation when progress was being made toward the signing of a peace agreement, peasants who had to seek refuge on Mexican soil regarded the Guatemalan army as a hostile institution owing to their abiding memory of the years in which violence was systematically applied. ... the members of the patrol ... grossly violate[d] the right to life by intentionally opening fire on members of the Aurora 8 de Octubre community. The verification does not reveal any evidence that the members of the community were armed, and there are sufficient elements to conclude that all the victims, including the three injured soldiers, were hit by bullets fired by members of the patrol.59 60. The information of the nuclear families of the victims executed and injured is detailed in the attached Annex to this report. 5. The investigations 61. The day after the events, the then-President of Guatemala, Ramiro De León Carpio, visited the community.60 According to information provided by the State, the then-president "acknowledged the institutional responsibility arising from the events" and "gave express orders to the competent authorities to the effect [that] a thorough investigation be opened immediately."61 62. The investigation of the case was initially conducted by the military court of first instance of the Department of Jalapa.62 According to information gathered by the CEH, on October 6, 1995, the Prosecutor General of the Republic and the first prosecutor assigned to the case visited the scene.63 The CEH said that the prosecutors collected the cartridge cases.64 However, they did not enter that act in the record of the proceeding.65 63. The CEH also found that the “Public Prosecution Service (Ministerio Público) failed to take the necessary steps to preserve the scene of the crime and evidence; the victims' clothing was lost and autopsies superficially performed without meeting the proper technical requirements."66 The petitioners say that: (i) the location where the events occurred was not cordoned off, which allowed large numbers of people to transit through the area; (ii) the deceased were not photographed; (iii) x-rays were not taken in the autopsies, so that it was not possible to show the metallic fragments of bullets in the corpses; and (iv) there was a delay of more than a month in taking statements from the survivors.67 The state did not refute those submissions or present evidence on the internal proceedings to the contrary 59 Annex 2. CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Volume VI, Illustrative Cases, Annex 1, Illustrative Case No. 3: Xamán Massacre. 60 Annex 2. CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Volume VI, Illustrative Cases, Annex 1, Illustrative Case No. 3: Xamán Massacre. 61 Annex 8. State’s communication of December 6, 1995. 62 Annex 4. Petitioners' communication received on November 16, 1995. Annex 8. State’s communication of December 6, 1995. 63 Annex 2. CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Volume VI, Illustrative Cases, Annex 1, Illustrative Case No. 3: Xamán Massacre. 64 Annex 2. CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Volume VI, Illustrative Cases, Annex 1, Illustrative Case No. 3: Xamán Massacre. 65 Annex 2. CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Volume VI, Illustrative Cases, Annex 1, Illustrative Case No. 3: Xamán Massacre. 66 Annex 2. CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Volume VI, Illustrative Cases, Annex 1, Illustrative Case No. 3: Xamán Massacre. 67 Annex 4. Petitioners' communication received on November 16, 1995. 14