CONCLUSION In short and as pointed out previously, as Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention clearly states and based on the congruent understanding of Articles 26(1) and 2, 28(h), 30(1),(2) and (3), 31 and 32 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, which interpret the said article of the Convention, it can be concluded, unequivocally, that compliance with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies must have occurred at the time the petition is lodged before the Commission, taking into consideration, also, any observations made by the State when responding to the relevant parts of the petition forwarded to it. However, this was not considered to be so in the Judgment, which, to the contrary, indicates that the decision on the objection filed by the State based on the petitioner’s failure to comply with this rule was taken by verifying that this requirement had been met when the Commission took a decision on the petition’s admissibility. Hence, the ruling infringes the provisions of Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention and the said regulatory provisions. The undersigned also dissents from the Judgment because, the “reinforcing or complementing” nature of the Convention that inspires the inter-American system of human rights as a whole is nullified, encouraging the lodging of cases before the system without the domestic remedies having been exhausted previously, which will result in such cases being examined simultaneously by the domestic jurisdiction and the interAmerican jurisdiction. Proceeding in this way not only makes the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies meaningless and inapplicable, but is also contrary to the Court’s affirmation that it “must safeguard the just balance between the protection of human rights, the ultimate purpose of the system, and the legal certainty and procedural balance that ensure the stability and reliability of the international protection.” 45 Consequently, it is in this sense that the undersigned shares the assertion of the Court itself as regards “the tolerance of ‘evident violations of the procedural rules established by the Convention itself [and, it should be added, by the Rules of Procedure of the Court and of the Commission,] would entail the loss of authority and credibility essential for the organs responsible for administering the system for the protection of human rights.”46 And this is so, because it is precisely these rules that guarantee the impartiality and independence of the Court when imparting justice in cases relating to human rights. Strict compliance with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is not, therefore, a mere legal formality. Rather, respect for this rule strengthens and enhances the inter-American human rights system, because it guarantees the principles of legal certainty, procedural balance and complementarity that sustain the system, leaving no margin or, at least, the smallest margin possible, for the perception that the Court’s rulings do not respond, strictly and exclusively, to considerations of justice – beyond the explicable discrepancies that they may elicit, particularly from those who consider them adverse. 45 Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015. Series C No. 292, para. 37. 46 Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 26, 2012. Series C 244, para. 43. 18