42 raised before the Administrative Commission regarding its own decisions, contradicts other subsequent acts of Congress itself, which reflect the State’s willingness to establish the possibility of examining the recourses filed (supra para. 89(16)). Hence, it is unclear whether these decisions were also removed from the control of other organs of Congress. This lack of clarity is such that, despite the express prohibition, some dismissed employees filed the said administrative recourse before Congress (supra para. 89(15) and (20)). In any case, irrespective of the need to exhaust the administrative proceeding, the fact that alleged victims filed recourses using this channel should not be understood to prejudice them in this context, particularly taking into account that another provision of the decree establishing the “streamlining of Congress” was in force that prevented filing an action for amparo to counter its effects (supra paras. 89(4) and 89(9) and infra paras. 117 to 121). * * * 114. The State has also argued that the alleged victims could have resorted to the administrative-law proceeding, which it considered the adequate and appropriate domestic remedy for filing their claims and, despite this, it was not used. 115. The Court observes that, according to the information in the file, six dismissed congressional employees – two who are alleged victims in this case (supra para. 89(29)) and four who are not – opted to resort to the administrative-law proceeding to request, inter alia, the annulment of one of the decisions ordering their dismissal. The actions were declared admissible in only two of these cases, even though most of the basic facts were almost identical.68 Also, from the said judgments it is clear that these employees filed recourses for reconsideration and/or of appeal using the administrative proceeding. 116. Accordingly, from the rulings of the domestic courts in the administrative-law jurisdiction in the six cases provided to the Court’s file, it is unclear whether it was necessary to exhaust the administrative proceeding before filing an action before the courts. In this regard, it is also unclear whether the administrative-law jurisdiction was viable or appropriate for the alleged victims to be able to contest their dismissal; consequently, the State cannot defend itself by arguing that the alleged victims have not attempted it, in order to allege that its obligation to provide an effective recourse has been fulfilled. * * * 117. In relation to the norms applied to those who were dismissed, it has been established that article 9 of Decree Law No. 25640 expressly prohibited the possibility of filing an action for amparo against its effects (supra para. 89(4), 89(9) and 113). As the expert witness Abad Yupanqui has stated, at the time of the facts “in each of 68 Thus, in November and December 1993 and December 1997, the Supreme Court of Justice considered inadmissible four administrative-law actions filed by the two alleged victims and another two persons. Also, in November and December 1995, the Supreme Court considered admissible two of these actions filed by the other two dismissed employees, who are not alleged victims in this case. From the November 1995 judgment it is clear that the plaintiff had filed recourses of reconsideration and appeal by way of the administrative channels, “which had not been decided.”