to personal integrity.” 15 Since the acts of the health staff constituted obstetric violence against Ms. Brítez Arce and affected her personal integrity and, ultimately, her life, it was perfectly possible to maintain the doctrine established in I.V. v. Bolivia. In that case, the Court held that the medical acts -which concluded with the forced sterilization of Ms. I.V.- had violated her right to personal integrity. In the present case, the infringement of the rights to personal integrity and to life of Ms. Brítez Arce were necessarily declared. For its part, in view of the recognition of international responsibility by the State, what must be analyzed is the provision of the State’s health care services in the framework of Article 26 of the Convention, assessing whether Argentina had complied with its obligations of progressivity and non-regression in the light of that norm. 21. In sum, this manner to proceed affects both the legal security that an international court must ensure and the legitimacy of its judgments because the reasoning provided simply ignores a norm that expressly limits the Court’s jurisdiction to hear eventual infringements of the ESCER. 22. The proper basis of a judicial decision is that its arguments allow the reader to follow it and to understand the reasoning employed by a court to arrive at its final decision. The determination to uphold the justiciability of the ESCER cannot be built upon the basis of ignoring the norms of jurisdiction that the Convention and its Optional Protocol establish. In this case, Argentina recognized its responsibility, which included a violation of Article 26, because it understood that the conduct of its agents did not attain the level of compliance of its obligations under the Convention. That does not mean, however, that the Court has jurisdiction to declare a violation of the right to health, as has been explained. 23. It must be remembered that Article 19 of the Protocol of San Salvador defines two types of protective mechanisms. A general one that is applicable to all the rights recognized therein, which consists in the investigations, observations and recommendations that the different bodies of the inter-American system may formulate in the reports that the States must present on the progressive development of the ESCER, and the other intended solely for the right to organize and join trade unions and the right to education and that enables their eventual violations to be heard by the Court. 24. Unfortunately, and as Medina and David have pointed out, the position of the majority undermines the effectiveness not only of the Protocol of San Salvador but also of Article 26, 16 a conventional provision that has a specific content that the Court can and should develop in the cases that it is called upon to hear. 25. A reading of Article 26 indicates that, other than what is contained on the civil and political rights specified and developed in Chapter II of the Convention, it establishes the obligation of the States Parties to adopt the “measures,” that is, the actions, measures or public policies necessary to achieve “progressively” the full effectiveness of the rights derived from the norms of the OAS Charter ”in accordance with their resources” (which is congruent with the progressive nature of the obligation) and by “legislation or other appropriate means.” In other words, each State Party has the obligation to formulate definitions and to make marked progress in these matters, in accordance with their domestic deliberative processes. 15 16 Cf. Para. 56. MEDINA and DAVID, “The American Convention on Human Rights” (2022:28). 5