64 No one shall be detained except with a written order issued by the Judge or by police authorities in case of flagrante delicto. The detainee shall be brought before the competent court, within twenty-four hours or in the term allowed by distance. These terms do not apply to the cases of terrorism, espionage, or illegal drug trafficking. In these cases, police authorities may effect the preventive detention of the people allegedly involved for a term no longer than fifteen running days. Notice shall be served upon the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judge, who may assume jurisdiction before the expiration of the above-mentioned term. 108. However, as already pointed out, after submitting the answer to the application, the State accepted the facts which occurred prior to September 2000 (supra paras. 52 to 60). According to the facts established by the Court, Wilson García-Asto was detained on June 30, 1995 by the DINCOTE personnel while we was at a bus stop and some “subversive” documents were allegedly among his belongings (supra paras. 97(11) and 97(12)). The Court considers that said detention was illegal, as it was effected without an arrest warrant issued by a competent judge, and not under circumstances of flagrante delicto, which is contrary to the requirements established in the Peruvian Constitution in this regard (supra para. 107). 109. Furthermore, the Court has stated that Article 7(5) of the Convention sets forth that any person who is detained shall be promptly brought before a judge, as an appropriate means to prevent arbitrary and illegal arrests. The immediate judicial control is a measure which tends to prevent detentions from being arbitrary or illegal, considering that in a democratic state, the judge is to guarantee the rights of the detainee, authorize the adoption of precautionary or coercive measures where they are strictly necessary, and see that, in general, the accused is treated consistently with the presumption of innocence.146 The mere knowledge by a judge that a person is detained does not imply compliance with that guarantee, as the detainee must appear personally and make his statement before the judge or a competent authority.147 110. In the case of Wilson García-Asto, he was placed in the custody of the competent judicial authority only seventeen days after his detention (supra paras. 97(11) and 97(20)). 111. The Court further considers that Article 6 of Decree-Law No. 25.659 of 1992, in force at the time the proceedings against the alleged victims were instituted, denied the persons charged with terrorism-related crimes and high treason the possibility of filing protective remedies (supra para. 97(2)). Said provision was amended by DecreeLaw No. 26.248, enacted on November 25, 1993 (supra para. 97(2)) which allowed, in principle, filing protective remedies on behalf of the persons accused of being involved in the commission of crimes of terrorism. The amended text set forth, inter alia, that the “Special Criminal Judge for Terrorism w[as] competent to take up the writs of Habeas Corpus, [and] in his absence, the ordinary Criminal Judge.” Nevertheless, the amended provision set forth that “[said writs of habeas corpus] would not be 146 Cf. Case of Acosta-Calderón, supra note 7, para. 78; Case of Tibi, supra note 142, para. 114; and Case of the Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers, supra note 142, para. 96. 147 Cf. Case of Acosta-Calderón, supra note 7, para. 78.