67 held in custody for a term longer than two thirds of the penalty requested by the Public Prosecutor in the indictment; 2. the possibility that the defendant escapes justice or thwarts the evidentiary procedures has disappeared, and 3. the defendant fulfills the bail imposed or, if appropriate, the insolvent offers a personal bail. 122. In turn, regarding release, Article 4 of Legislative Decree No. 926 of February 20, 2003, set forth that “[t]he annulment declared according to [said] Legislative Decree shall not result in the release of the defendants, nor shall it entail the suspension of the existing summonses.” 123. The first supplementary provision of Legislative Decree No. 926, consistent with Article 4 thereof, set forth that the detention time limit provided in Article 137 (supra para. 120) of the “Criminal Procedural Code in the proceedings to which [said] Legislative Decree is applied [,] shall be calculated as from the date of issuance of the order declaring the annulment.” 124. The annulment of the criminal proceedings instituted against Wilson García-Asto and heard by “faceless” judges was ordered on January 15, 2003 by the Third Criminal Chamber of the High Court of Justice of Lima (Tercera Sala Penal de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Lima), which revoked the decision of November 27, 2002, declaring the writ of habeas corpus filed on his behalf to be groundless, and ordering that the case file be forwarded to the competent authority within forty-eight hours, so that the pertinent legal steps be taken (supra para. 97(31)). However, only on March 10, 2003 did the First Special Criminal Court for Terrorism (Primer Juzgado Especializado Penal en Delito de Terrorismo) ordered the commencement of the investigation proceedings in the new trial instituted against Wilson García-Asto, wherein the precautionary measure of imprisonment was ordered (supra para. 97(34)). During that term of one month and twenty-five days, the alleged victim was deprived of freedom without having been neither sentenced nor prosecuted. 125. By virtue of the foregoing, the Court considers that during the term between January 15, 2003 and March 10, 2003, Wilson García-Asto was arbitrarily deprived of freedom, in violation of Article 7(3) of the Convention. * 126. The Court is aware of the legislative changes advanced by Peru so as to grant new proceedings to the persons who were tried for terrorism by “faceless” judges or in trials before the military jurisdiction (supra paras. 97(5) to 97(9)). However, upon analyzing the precautionary measure of deprivation of freedom imposed upon the alleged victim, the Court shall analyze whether the State has proceeded in accordance with the provisions of the Convention regarding the exceptional application of deprivation of freedom in the instant case. 127. The Court notes that the First Special Criminal Court for Terrorism (Primer Juzgado Especializado Penal en Delito de Terrorismo), in the order for pre-trial proceedings to be commenced issued on March 10, 2003, upon stating the grounds for alleging procedural danger in the case of Wilson García-Asto as the basis for ordering the precautionary measure of preventive detention, stated that: