30 C. Working Meeting In order to evaluate the services provided by the Coordination and Security Agency, deal with specific problems, make personal contacts and coordinate, working meetings must be planned in the countries whose security services will be part of this system. Bilateral or special working meetings should also be promoted when required by the situation […].21 In another [document of the “Terror Files”] it is possible to find the draft of the presentation by [Francisco Alcibíades] Brítez Borges [who was the Asuncion Police Chief at the time]. After describing the “subversive movements” active in the country, the Paraguayan police agent again insists on the advantages of international cooperation: […] And finally, I would like to call attention to an important conclusion. For the moment, we, the Paraguayans, feel the effects of these movements at the national level. But we are aware that the conspiracy has an international scope. Owing to its traditional anti-communist stance and its strategic geographical position, Paraguay is the current target country. Once Marxism has been established here, our neighbors’ flanks are exposed. Therefore, close, open and fluid collaboration is called for; this is not one country assisting another, but self-defense shared by all, in the face of the common need to defend our institutions and our way of life. For the moment, even though we have to rely on our own forces, we are totally confident. We do not believe that any force is capable of breaking the solid cohesion of 84% of the population who belong to the Colorado Party, backed by the vigilant and well-disciplines Armed Forces of the Nation.22 A document originating from the Argentine security forces proposed the following courses of action: AGENDA FOR THE MEETING WITH THE PARAGUAYAN G2 To be held in Asunción on 27 and 28 JUNE/78 […] Propose and coordinate an information sheet for the identification and registration of individuals suspected of being involved. Coordinate norms for procedures to deal with the appearance of hostile political groups operating in border areas. […] Set a tentative date for the next bilateral meeting in Buenos Aires. Determine the probable evolution of the subversive situation and coordinate counterintelligence measures for the joint action of both armies.23 61(8) In a document of September 1976, described as one of the first reports on this operation, the attaché in Buenos Aires of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Robert Scherrer, sent a cable to the agency’s headquarters in Washington D.C., in which he summarized the functioning of the operation: 21 Cf. filing cabinet 245 of the “Terror Archives”, p. 156, transcribed in Es mi informe, supra note 11, p. 257. 22 Cf. filing cabinet 147 of the “Terror Archives”, 1976, 13-page document on the Investigations Department letterhead paper, transcribed in Es mi informe, supra note 11, pp. 258 and 259. 23 Cf. book D6, p. 1055, undated document without a letterhead, located in the “Terror Archives”, transcribed in Es mi informe, supra note 11, p. 260.