50 l. Expert opinion of Iduvina Hernández, a journalist31 From 1992 to 1995 she worked in the national section of “Revista Crónica” in Guatemala, for which reason she studied the operation of the intelligence systems in Guatemala and especially of the Presidential General Staff. Her sources included interviews with two heads of the Presidential General Staff, intelligence directors and military officials of the various governments at the time. She also knew of the Mack Chang case. The counterinsurgency doctrine is a modality undertaken by application of the doctrine of national security to the specific case, positing that the State is the main axis of security and acting by defining a given person as an internal enemy of this State because he or she is considered a dissident. The State also assigns to the armed forces, to the Army, the responsibility for that doctrine. This doctrine was applied in Guatemala, especially during the armed domestic conflict. When Guatemala signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), it adopted special military training manuals (for intelligence, interrogation, and source management), within the framework of the national security doctrine, which defined the contents of the campaign plans that governed the activities of the Army and the intelligence objectives of all units, including the Presidential General Staff. This doctrine, contrary to international humanitarian law, defined the combat structure of the armed forces and set the frame for selection of intelligence objectives, defining the work methods, the structure and the deployment of the various organizations in the intelligence system. Any person or any organization whose activity might be deemed contrary to the State and to the established order was classified as an “internal enemy.” In this case, an academic field research study that might encompass areas or spaces that were of interest as military or intelligence objectives within the counterinsurgency process would fall under this definition of an “internal enemy.” During the 1980s and early ‘90s, the intelligence systems in Guatemala had a structure with hierarchical responsibilities, down to the operational units of the various sections or levels of intelligence, in each of the military departments. In addition to their legal intelligence functions, they conducted absolutely illegal and clandestine intelligence operations and activities. An intelligence channel is a mechanism by which an intelligence structure establishes the lines of communication with its various units, independently of the normal hierarchical structure of an army. In other words, there is an established hierarchical structure from the general commander, through the high command, down to he heads of the Presidential General Staff and then the military zones. This is the normal military channel. The governing law for the Guatemalan Army establishes several General Staffs, including the Presidential General Staff. While the legal mission of the Presidential General Staff, which still exists today with no changes in its functions and structures, 31 A Guatemalan national. She is currently the executive director of a non-governmental organization in Guatemala that promotes reform of the security and intelligence services and democratic control over them in Guatemala, to avoid abuse and violations of human rights. In 1999, she was a consultant for the Myrna Mack Foundation. Her expert opinion was on the organization and functioning of the military intelligence structures.