13 VII. Nature of the international responsibility of the State, and its Relationship with the Realization of Justice and the Struggle against Impunity. 36. As long as an international human rights court cannot determine the international criminal responsibility of the individual, and an international criminal court cannot determine the responsibility of the State, impunity will probably persist, being only partly punished by the former and the latter. International responsibility of the State is neither exclusively civil (as suggested by the duty to provide reparation for damage), nor exclusively criminal (as suggested by legitimization of a punishment). It is a collective responsibility of the State, alongside the international criminal responsibility of the individual. International responsibility of the State contains both civil and criminal aspects, in the current stage of evolution of international law. 37. The viewpoint, espoused by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the past, according to which compensations “with exemplarizing or dissuasive purposes” have no place in international law,45 has been completely surpassed. It is in accordance with a reactionary vision, shaped by the precepts of juridical positivism, that until recently (whether consciously or not) held back development regarding this matter, and which no longer reflects, as stated above, the current stage of evolution of international law in this regard. Furthermore, in my view, realization of the exemplarizing or dissuasive purposes can –and must- be sought not only through compensations, but also through other (non-pecuniary) forms of reparation. 38. Irrespective of the civil or criminal elements of the international responsibility of the State, I believe it is undeniable that reparations can adopt a punitive or repressive nature,46 to ensure the realization of justice and to put an end to impunity (cf. infra). It is also necessary to bear in mind that, while reparations (both pecuniary and moral) benefit the injured party directly, punishment (or repressive action against the State found in violation), in turn, benefits the human community itself as a whole; not to admit this would be to allow the State found in violation to remove itself from the Law.47 39. As C.Th. Eustathiades (supra) had done, Hans Kelsen also maintained that States and individuals are subjects of international law, as the latter places obligations on both; hence the coexistence of international responsibility both of individuals (physical persons) and of States (legal persons). In the case of the States, their responsibility is collective, and H. Kelsen recognized that a State, when it commits a grave violation of international law, commits a delict or a crime.48 Noting that the individual responsible for said violation acted on behalf of the State, H. Kelsen also 45 . Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR), Velásquez Rodríguez versus Honduras case (Compensatory Indemnification), Judgment of 21.07.1989, Series C, n. 7, p. 24, paras. 38-39; I-ACtHR), Godínez Cruz versus Honduras case (Compensatory Indemnification), Judgment of 21.07.1989, Series C, n. 8, p. 21, paras. 36-37. 46 . M. Gounelle, "Quelques remarques sur la notion de `crime international' et sur l'évolution de la responsabilité internationale de l'État", in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter - Le droit international: unité et diversité, Paris, Pédone, 1981, pp. 317-318. 47 . H. Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra n. (34), pp. 355-357. 48 . Cf. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, N.Y., Rinehart & Co. Inc., 1952, pp. 9, 11-13, 97-100, 104-105, 107 and 114-117.