7 conceptual basis of the duty of prevention, non-compliance with which, in turn, is the ground for the prompt imputation to the State at issue of the delicts of legislative action or omission on the part of its organs9. 26. One cannot fail to admit that the non-compliance with an international obligation, and the consequent responsibility for that, may arise - to evoke an example cited by another illustrious jurist, - by the sole conduct of a State whose Legislative Power fails to take measures that, by means of a treaty, it had undertaken to take 10. There is no need to take into account the so-called element of "damage" - resulting from the subsequent application of a law - to determine the configuration of an act - or omission - that is internationally illicit11 and that per se violates human rights. 27. The thesis of the objective responsibility correctly emphasizes the element of the due diligence on the part of the State, of the control that this latter ought to exert over all its organs and agents in order to avoid that, by action or omission, the recognized human rights are violated. This being so, this is the thesis that, in my view, most contributes to ensure the effectiveness (effet utile) of a human rights treaty. This is the thesis that best serves the fulfilment of the object and purpose of human rights treaties and the determination of the configuration or of the birth of the international responsibility of the States Parties, in the light of the conventional obligations of protection enshrined in those treaties and of the general principles of international law. I cannot see how to condition the determination of the noncompliance with the conventional obligations of protection to an eventual verification of the subjective element of fault or culpa of the States Parties, or of the occurrence of a subsequent damage. 28. The general obligations under Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in their turn, validate, in my view, the thesis of the objective responsibility of the States Parties. The specific obligations pertaining to each one of the rights protected by the Convention are to be related not only to the general duty to guarantee them (Article 1(1)) as the Court has done since the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases, but equally to the other general duty to adopt measures of domestic law (Article 2) so as to harmonize this latter with the international norms of protection. 29. The interpretation followed by the Court in recent contentious cases (El Amparo, Caballero Delgado and Santana, Genie Lacayo) is based, in my view, on a selfimposed limitation, incomprehensible to me, of the extent of its own faculties of protection. There is nothing in the American Convention, nor in the Statute or the Regulations of the Court, that determines that such self-imposed limitation is the only possible interpretation of the extent of its faculties in the light of the legal instruments that govern its functioning. Quite the contrary, the interpretation which I firmly sustain, warranted by the Statute and the Regulations of the Court, is the one 9. and 54. Paul Guggenheim, Traité de Droit International Public, vol. II, Geneva, Georg, 1954, pp. 52 10. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, "Second Report on State Responsibility", Yearbook of the [U.N.] International Law Commission (1970)-II, p. 194. 11. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, "Third Report on State Responsibility", Yearbook of the [U.N.] International Law Commission (1971)-II, Part I, p. 223, and cf. pp. 219 and 222.