an effective judicial remedy to control the deprivation of liberty of the victims under the conventional standards. The Commission, thus, considered that the State violated the rights established in Articles 7(6) and 25(1) of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Jorge Marcial Tzompaxtle Tecpile, Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López. B. Considerations of the Court 93. The Court recalls that the State partially acknowledged its responsibility with respect to the violation of Articles 7, 8(2) and 25 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the obligation to respect the rights contained therein, to the detriment of Jorge Marcial Tzompaxtle Tecpile, Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López (supra paras. 14 and 15). The Court also understood in Chapter IV that there is no longer a controversy on those violations. While respecting the aforementioned, the Court, in view of the nature of this case, finds it necessary to refer to some issues on the right to personal liberty and to analyze the violations of the Convention that were not acknowledged by the State regarding the institutions of arraigo and of pre-trial detention that exist in the Mexican legal order. This section will address those points in the following order: 1) general considerations on the rights to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence during criminal investigations and proceedings; 2) the compatibility of arraigo and pre-trial detention with the Convention; 3) the application of arraigo and of pre-trial detention in this case, and 4) the conclusion. 94. The Court will also analyze the institutions of arraigo and pre-trial detention that were applied to the victims of this case, using the norms in force when the events occurred. B.1. General considerations on the rights to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence during criminal investigations and proceedings 95. As a preliminary matter, the Court recalls that the States have the obligation to guarantee security and to maintain public order within their territories and that, to do so, they may employ the necessary means to combat delinquency and organized crime, including methods that imply restrictions to or even deprivations of personal liberty. However, a State’s power is not unlimited in achieving those aims, regardless of the gravity of certain acts and the culpability of the alleged perpetrators; in particular, the authorities may not infringe rights set forth in the Convention such as, inter alia, the rights to the presumption of innocence, to personal liberty, to due process and the prohibition of carrying out unlawful or arbitrary detentions. 65 96. With respect to the arbitrary arrests or imprisonments referred to in Article 7(3) of the Convention, the Court has determined that no one may be subjected to arrest or imprisonment for reasons and by methods that, although classified as lawful, may be incompatible with the respect for the fundamental rights of the individual because, inter alia, they are unreasonable, unpredictable or disproportionate. 66 Domestic law, the applicable procedures and the corresponding general explicit or tacit general principles must, per se, be compatible with the Convention. Thus, “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law,” but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and unpredictability. 67 For its part, Article 8(2) refers to the presumption of innocence. 97. The Court has held that, in order to ensure that a precautionary measure that restricts liberty not be arbitrary and that the presumption of innocence is not negatively affected, it is necessary that: 65 Cf. Mutatis mutandis, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 154 and Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015. Series C No. 292, para. 262. Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 47 and Case of Habbal et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits. Judgment of August 31, 2022. Series C No. 463, para. 63. 66 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 92 and Case of Habbal et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 63. 67 24