Organized Crime of 1996, but not in the constitution. It was incorporated into the constitution on June 18, 2008. In addition, both the Federal Code of 1999 and the Federal Law of 1996 have been amended. When the acts occurred in this case, arraigo was found in two federal laws: Article 12 of the Federal Law and Article 133 bis of the Federal Code (supra paras. 36 and 37). 121. The Court recalls that, from January 18, 2006 to April 17, 2006, Jorge Marcial and Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López were deprived of their liberty by the application of arraigo and that the judicial decision that ordered it refers to both Article 12 and Article 133 bis 103 (supra para. 36). The Court notes that the judicial decision that ordered the measure of arraigo in this case (supra para. 57) referred precisely to those two laws to justify that it was competent to hear and resolve the request for arraigo, although in analyzing the requisites for its order, it resorted to Article 12 of the Federal Law. (supra para. 41). 104 Thus, the Court finds it pertinent to analyze the measure of arraigo contained in those two norms. 122. As has been indicated, Article 12 stated that the “judge may, at the request of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Federation and taking into account the nature of the alleged event and the personal circumstances of the accused, decree arraigo against the accused in the place, form and means of implementation set out in the request, under the surveillance of the authority, which is to be exercised by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and its aides and which may be extended for the period strictly necessary for processing of the preliminary investigation, but not to exceed ninety days, so that the person in question may participate in clarifying the events imputed to him, which might reduce the period of arraigo.” 123. For its part, Article 133 bis established that the “judicial authority may, at the petition of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, decree house arraigo or impose a prohibition to leave a determined geographical area without its authorization, for a person against whom a criminal action is being prepared, when there exists the risk of evading the action of justice. […] House arraigo or the prohibition to leave a determined geographical area may be extended for the period strictly necessary, but may not exceed thirty calendar days in the case of arraigo and sixty days in the case of the prohibition to leave a determined geographical area.” 124. The Court will now analyze the different aspects of these norms in light of the American Convention and the Court’s case law. i. Arraigo and due process 125. Every person, who, as a result of any investigation or proceedings, is believed to be a perpetrator of or participant in an imprisonable act, is the holder of the guarantees of due process. The institution of arraigo of a pre-procedural nature for the purposes of investigation is an absolute denial of such guarantees since the detainee is stripped of protection. Therefore, no restrictions of any kind to liberty may be imposed other than in criminal proceedings. Otherwise, this would constitute the very denial of due process. ii. On the right of persons subjected to arraigo to be heard and to be brought promptly before a judge or other official authorized by law to exercise judicial functions and the right not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves and the defenselessness of those persons a. On the right of persons subjected to arraigo to be heard and to be brought promptly before a judge or other official authorized by law to exercise judicial functions 126. As the expert Luis Raúl González Pérez stated, arraigo is “an administrative measure authorized Cf. Order of Arraigo 03/2006, decreed by the Fourteenth District Court of the Federal District for Federal Criminal Proceedings, January 18, 2006 (evidence file, f. 382 et seq.). 103 104 Cf. Order of Arraigo 03/2006, decreed by the Twelfth District Court of the Federal District for Federal Criminal Proceedings, January 1, 2006 (evidence file, ff. 383 and 386). 30