163. With regard to the purpose of pre-trial detention, the Court notes that the State in its answering brief affirmed that it was “one of the most active precautionary measures to dissuade persons involved in these schemes from continuing to collaborate in criminal organizations. It also seeks to have a preventive and dissuasive effect.” It added that “[…] due to the transcendence and gravity of these offenses, the State has considered it necessary to establish pre-trial detention as an effective mechanism to prosecute these offenses and eliminate these conducts not only from the point of view of the special role of prevention of criminal law, but also from that of prevention in general, in seeking a dissuasive effect on the commission of offenses.” On this point, the Court recalls that its case law has been clear and consistent in acknowledging only two legitimate purposes for pre-trial detention (supra para. 106) and that neither “the prevention in general” of certain offenses, no matter how serious, nor the “dissuasive effect” is not one of them nor should it be (supra paras. 108 and 109). 164. A reading of Article 161, where it deals with criminal proceedings for an offense that involves sanctions of the deprivation of liberty, it appears that when the substantive assumptions are proved, it is sufficient to verify that the statement of the accused has been taken (or there is a record of refusal to declare) in order to apply pre-trial detention. Article 161, thus, necessarily establishes the application of pre-trial for offenses that involve a certain gravity once the substantive assumptions are established, without conducting an analysis on the need for the measure of deprivation of liberty, taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the case. 165. The Court holds that Article 161 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure of 1999, applied in this case (supra para. 43), contained provisions that, per se, contravene various rights established in the Convention, such as the rights not to be arbitrarily deprived of liberty (Art. 7(5)) and to the presumption of innocence (Art. 8(2)). The Court, thus, concludes that the State infringed its obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law established in Article 2 of the Convention regarding the right to personal liberty (Art. 7) and to the presumption of innocence (Art. 8(2)) to the detriment of Jorge Marcial and Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López. B.3. On the application of arraigo and of pre-trial detention in the present case 166. Regarding the application of arraigo and of pre-trial detention against Jorge Marcial and Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López by the orders of January 18, 2006 and April 22, 2006 (supra paras. 57 and 63), the Court notes, in the first place, that the State acknowledged its international responsibility for violating those rights by those orders. 167. In the previous chapter, the Court determined that the arraigo established in Article 12 of the Federal Law against Organized Crime of 1996 and in Article 133 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure of 1999 and pre-trial detention found in Article 161 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure of 1999 contravene the terms of the Convention, infringing the obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law, as established in Article 2, in relation to the rights to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence set out in Articles 7 and 8(2) of the Convention. There is no doubt that by applying those measures that, per se, contravene the terms of the Convention, the domestic authorities infringed the rights to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence to the detriment of the victims, thus failing to comply with its obligation of respect contained in Article 1(1) of the Convention. B.4. Conclusion 168. In view of the above and of the State’s acknowledgement of responsibility, the Court determines that the State is responsible for violating the rights to personal integrity established in Article 7(1), 7(2), 7(3), 7(5) and 7(6) of the Convention, to the presumption of innocence set forth in Article 8(2) and not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself contemplated in Article 8(2)(g), in relation to the obligation to respect and ensure the rights established in Article 1(1), as well as the obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law contained in Article 2, for having applied the institution of arraigo to the detriment of Jorge Marcial Tzompaxtle Tecpile, Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López (supra paras. 156 and 157). 39