those of State institutions, such as the Supreme Court, the Legislature, the federal administrative authorities and civil society that are opposed to this legal institution.” It claimed that this mechanism “could result, democratically, in the elimination of arraigo and it therefore considered it the ideal mechanism to comply with the State’s commitments under the Memorandum of Understanding.” 206. With regard to the elimination of pre-trial detention sua sponte, the State indicated that “this claim was unacceptable” because both the representatives and the Commission “have failed to demonstrate how the institution of pre-trial detention violated the right to personal liberty of Jorge Marcial Tzompaxtle Tecpile, Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López and, therefore, the Court could not analyze that legal institution in its totality from a specific case in which the alleged violation did not exist.” It also claimed that its argument was strengthened since the conclusions in the Commission’s Report on the Merits “did not consider that recommendation necessary.” 207. With regard to this request, the Court notes, in the first place, that in the Memorandum of Understanding, the State “committed to take steps to pass legislation to eliminate the institution of arraigo in the Mexican normative by means of meetings to be held in coordination with the Congress.” 208. The Court notes that the request for reparations presented by the representatives related to the amended normative refers to the institutions of arraigo and of pre-trial detention (supra para. 204). It should be remembered that in Chapter VIII.1 of this judgment, the Court concluded that the State is responsible violating its obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law, established in Article 2, regarding the rights to personal liberty and the presumption of innocence (Articles 7 and 8(2)), to the detriment of Jorge Marcial and Gerardo Tzompaxtle Tecpile and Gustavo Robles López, because they had been charged with the legal institutions of arraigo and pre-trial detention that were, by means of their regulation through the Federal Law against Organized Crime of 1996 and the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure of 1999, per se, contrary to the Convention (supra para. 157). 209. However, as has been indicated in the chapter on the facts (supra paras. 39 to 41), the texts of these norms has been amended after the events that gave rise to the case. The Court will now analyze the current normative provisions and compare them with those that were in force when the events occurred to determine whether the issues in the normative that was applied were corrected or whether they continue in the amended norms or in others that subsequently appeared in the legal order. 47