20 provisions of Article 7(6) and 25 of the American Convention. XII Violation of Articles 8(1), 8(2), 8(2)(c), 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(e) 67. The Commission contended that by subjecting Mr. Suárez-Rosero to prolonged preventive detention, the State violated: a. his right to be tried within a "reasonable time", as established in Article 7(5) of the Convention, b. his right to be brought before a competent tribunal, as established in Article 8(1) of the Convention, and c. the principle of presumption of innocence, as established in Article 8(2) of the Convention. 68. In that regard, Ecuador maintained in its brief of final arguments that one cannot ignore the important fact that the courts acted with the greatest speed, given the Judiciary's personnel and financial constraints. Its workload has been increasing with the expansion of the docket, which contains over forty-three volumes -comprising more than four thousand three hundred substantive pages- owing to the large number of persons implicated in the so-called Operation "Ciclón". ... There may have been some breaches of the terms and periods established for the substantiation of an accusation, or non-observance at some time of the formalities in the courts, but let it be said that in no way did the Ecuadorian State curtail Mr. Suárez's action, since he was able at all times adequately to exercise his legitimate right of defense. His inalienable rights were not violated nor was his sentence unjust; it is, after all, deserved, as the First Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Quito found. 69. Article 8(1) of the Convention establishes that [e]very person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 70. The purpose of the principle of "reasonable time" to which Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the American Convention refer is to prevent accused persons from remaining in that situation for a protracted period and to ensure that the charge is promptly disposed of. In the instant case, the first act of the proceeding was Mr. Suárez-Rosero's arrest on June 23, 1992, and, therefore, the time must be calculated from that moment. 71. The Court considers the proceeding to be at an end when a final and firm judgment is delivered and the jurisdiction thereby ceases (cf. Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Guincho du 10 juillet 1984, Serie A nº 81, para. 29) and that, particularly in criminal matters, that time must cover the entire proceeding, including any appeals that may be filed. On the basis of the evidence contained in the Case before it, the Court considers that the proceeding against Mr. Suárez-Rosero ended in the Ecuadorian jurisdiction on September 9, 1996, the date on which he was convicted by the President of the Superior Court of Justice of Quito. Although at the public hearing Mr. Suárez-Rosero referred to an appeal of that conviction,