14 for being the first case on freedom of thought and of expression resolved by the Court, at the first working session held by it in the XXIst century, but also - and above all - for having a bearing on a question which is common to so many Latin American and Caribbean countries, and which touches on the foundations of the law on the international responsibility of the State and the very origin of such responsibility. In the light of the thoughts developed in this Concurring Opinion, may I conclude, in sum, that: first, the international responsibility of a State Party to a human rights treaty arises at the moment of the occurrence of an international wrongful act - or omission - (tempus commisi delicti), imputable to that State, in violation of the treaty at issue; second, any act or omission of the State, on the part of any of the Powers - Executive, Legislative or Judicial - or agents of the State, irrespective of their hierarchy, in breach of a human rights treaty, engages the international responsibility of the State Party at issue; third, the distribution of competences between the powers and organs of the State, and the principle of the separation of powers, although of the greatest relevance in the ambit of constitutional law, do not condition the determination of the international responsibility of a State Party to a human rights treaty; fourth, any norm of domestic law, irrespective of its rank (constitutional or infraconstitutional), can, by its own existence and applicability, per se engage the responsibility of a State Party to a human rights treaty; fifth, a norm of domestic law which, by being in force, per se creates a legal situation which affects the rights protected by a human rights treaty, constitutes, in the context of a concrete case, a continuing violation of such treaty; sixth, the existence of victims provides the decisive criterion for distinguishing an examination in abstracto of a norm of domestic law, from a determination of the incompatibility in concreto of such norm with the human rights treaty at issue; seventh, in the context of the international protection of human rights, the rule of exhaustion of remedies of domestic law is endowed with a procedural rather than substantive nature (as a condition of admissibility of a petition or complaint to be resolved in limine litis), thus conditioning the implementation but not the birth of the international responsibility of a State Party to a human rights treaty; eighth, the rule of exhaustion of remedies of domestic law has a juridical content of its own, which determines its extent (comprising the effective judicial remedies), which is not extended to reforms of a constitutional or legislative order; ninth, the substantive norms - pertaining to the protected rights - of a human rights treaty are directly applicable in the domestic law of the States Parties to such treaty; tenth, there exists no legal obstacle or impossibility at all for the direct application at domestic law level of the international norms of protection, but what is rather required is the will (animus) of the public power (above all the Judiciary) to apply them, amidst the understanding that one will thereby be giving concrete