74. The Court has considered that the arbitrary nature of measures of deprivation of liberty should be assessed based on three factors: (i) that evidence exists to bring charges against or to prosecute an individual – in other words, that the “substantive presumptions” to order the precautionary measures are presented; (ii) that these comply with the four elements of the “proportionality test” – that is: legitimacy of the purpose (which must be compatible con the American Convention), 67 appropriateness, necessity and strict proportionality,68 and (iii) that the decision imposing such measures includes sufficient reasoning to permit an assessment of whether they are in keeping with the foregoing conditions.69 75. With regard to the first points, the Court has established that, before assessing the purpose of the measure, in order to comply with the requirements necessary to restrict the right to personal liberty by preventive detention, there must be sufficient evidence leading to a reasonable supposition that the individual subjected to the process could have participated in the wrongful act investigated.70 76. Regarding the second point, the Court has indicated that, when imposing a measure of deprivation of liberty, the judicial authority must take into consideration the proportionality of the measure. Consequently, the judicial authority should only impose measures of this nature when it has verified that they are: (i) appropriate for achieving the objective sought; (ii) necessary, in the sense that they are absolutely essential to achieve the required objective and there is no available measure less injurious to the right affected that is equally suitable to achieve the proposed purpose, and (iii) that they are strictly proportionate, so that the sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to liberty is not exaggerated or disproportionate compared to the advantages obtained by this restriction and achievement of the intended purpose.71 This Court has indicated that the measure should only be imposed when it is necessary to meet a legitimate objective, namely: that the defendant will not impede the development of the proceedings or evade the action of justice. 72 The Court considers that only those objectives that are specifically related to the efficient development of the proceedings – in other words, to the danger of flight of the defendant (directly established in Article 7(5) of the American Convention), or to avoid the defendant impeding the development of the proceedings – should be considered legitimate. 77. On the third point, the Court has considered that any restriction of freedom that does not include sufficient reasoning that permits an assessment of whether it is in keeping with the foregoing conditions will be arbitrary and, therefore, will violate Article 7(3) of the Convention.73 In addition, in order to respect the presumption of innocence (Article 8(2)), when precautionary measures are ordered that restrict freedom, in each specific case, the State must justify, clearly and with reasons, 67 Cf. Case of the Women Victims of Sexual Torture v. Mexico, supra, para. 251. Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 197, and Case of the Women Victims of Sexual Torture v. Mexico, supra, para. 251. 68 Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, para. 128, and Case of the Women Victims of Sexual Torture v. Mexico, supra, para. 251. See, for greater details, Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, supra, paras. 93 to 111. 69 Cf. Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 90, and Case of the Women Victims of Sexual Torture v. Mexico, para. 240. 70 Cf. Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 288, para. 120, Case of Wong Ho Wing v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2015. Series C No. 297, para. 248, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 25, 2018. Series C No. 354, para. 356. 71 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Reparations and costs. Judgment of January 20, 1999. Series C No. 44, para. 77; Case of Wong Ho Wing v. Peru, supra, para. 250, and Case of the Women Victims of Sexual Torture v. Mexico, supra, para. 251. 72 Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, supra, para. 128, and Case of the Women Victims of Sexual Torture v. Mexico, supra, para. 251. 73 20