6 25. Among the measures of satisfaction ordered by the Court in the context of reparations, the acknowledgement of international liability by the State has already become systematic. The Court’s judgment certifies that such liability does in fact exist as a consequence of a wrongful act attributable to the State. Therefore, from a strictly legal perspective –i.e. for the formal validity of the judgment and compliance with the obligations thereby imposed— there is no need for the State to acknowledge its liability, but to fulfill the duties imposed by it. However, if made at a public act and in the presence of highranking authorities –the Court does not decide which such authorities should be present; the decision in this regard lies with the State, and it is to be consistent with the importance of the facts and the formal nature of the act–, such acknowledgement bears special moral relevance to the satisfaction of the victims or their next of kin and has political significance for the protection of human rights. 26. Such satisfaction may include –and often has, an encouraging occurrence that has been highlighted by the Court— some additional public expression. In this regard, there have been apologies to the victims or their next of kin and requests for their forgiveness, condemnations of the violations, offers to pass measures favorable to the victims and preventing new violations, etc. A deeper analysis is in order regarding the possibility, convenience and relevance of asking the authority to apologize to the victims or obtain their forgiveness, considering the nature of the “apology,” the moral qualities of which are indisputable but which calls for further consideration from the legal standpoint. 27. Generally, an apology for a serious violation is of specific ethical value for both the person offering it and the one at whom the apology is addressed. In these cases, the person offering an apology is not –even though in certain cases it might in fact be— the one who actually committed the offense. It is a formal, rather than a substantial, expression. It is the State who, acting through a state agent, apologizes for the wrongful conduct engaged in by another agent of the State. The latter one is the responsible party –morally, as well as legally–; conversely, the former is unrelated to the facts, being tied to the proceeding because of his or her official capacity and not because of his or her guilt, and is alien to the deep feelings, intimate pain and serious alterations that the facts have caused to the victim. 28. As far as the person to whom the apology is addressed is concerned, we should consider the meaning of the forgiveness sought and granted: does it provide absolution? Does it redeem the person offering the apology? Does it produce any legal effect at all, even though it does certainly have moral implications? Basically, what is the point of an apology for extremely serious facts (that sometimes, to be perfectly honest, seem beyond forgiveness) and what is its true validity in connection with the proceeding, the judgment, the State’s duty of justice, the claims to which the victim is entitled? Is it a part of the settlement and reconciliation? And, if so, what settling effects does it produce from the legal standpoint of the international Court’s judgment, which extends to the duties of the State? 29. In the experience of the Inter-American Court, it is increasingly more frequent to find cases in which there is a full or partial acknowledgement of liability by the State, which accepts (confesses to, as a State) the existence of the violation and the identity of the affected parties, recognizes that such violations breach specific provisions of the ACHR and even commits to certain reparations. This phenomenon marks a positive trend in the protection of human rights and the legal and moral redress to the victims. The Court has recognized the merits of this trend and the value entailed by the acknowledgement in each particular case. 30. It has been said that the acknowledgement might be intended to prevent the facts from being assessed by the Court and revealed to society, thus impairing the right to learn