21 This is an emblematic case as “the professor and the nine students were first arbitrarily pointed out as terrorists and considered the authors of the car bomb in Tarata Street, [and] they were abducted and disappeared under said presumption. [Besides,] they were tortured” before being executed […] They were buried three times […] and finally, the obstinate and systematic way in which the highest authorities of the State […] tried to conceal and deny [every fact related to the events] and they still continue to do so.” j) Retired General Rodolfo Robles- Espinoza, military who denounced the Grupo Colina (Colina Group) and the Intelligence Services in Perú At the time the events took place, he was Commander General of the Third Military Region in Perú and had the rank of Division General. He knew about the existence of the Grupo Colina (Colina Group) “as a result of [the] events of [La Cantuta since] some officials and auxiliary personnel who were working or had worked with him before and who belonged to the Army Intelligence Service informed[…] him of the existence of this group or death squad [and] of the different ‘special intelligence operations’ attributed to them.” The aforementioned group had been created “in the context of the war against Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) under the initial argument of national pacification, arguing about the need to create an intelligence group for the analysis of the documentation seized” from that organization. Vladimiro Montesinos promoted the creation of the Grupo Colina (Colina Group) and he imposed it on the Commander General of the Army in 1991,[…] counting on the firm support of Perú Defense Minister […] and the consent of President Alberto Fujimori.” Officially, the Grupo Colina (Colina Group), is an “Operative Intelligence Detachment, pursuant to the organizational schedule and, within the budgetary structure of the Army it is considered a standing organization, formed by approximately fifty officials […] trained for special intelligence missions, including secret operations[. P]articularly, they were employed as group for extra-legal executions.” The Grupo Colina (Colina Group) was related to the armed forces through the DINTE (Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército) (Army Intelligence Board), which is organized in SubDivisions to perform all the duties it is in charge of, and it has an operative or executive unit, the Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército (Army Intelligence Service) (SIE). “The aforementioned Operative Intelligence Detachment was formally created within the SIE (and its members named themselves informally Grupo Colina (Colina Group)) and it was in charge of special intelligence tasks[…].” Regarding the relation between the Grupo Colina (Colina Group) and the intelligence services of the State, he said that the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) (National Intelligence Service) was the leading entity and it commanded (with legal support) all the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces and the Perú National Police (PNP) as well as the respective intelligence bodies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were organized under a vertical system where all of them reported to […] Vladimiro Montesinos [who was the real chief of the SIN].” “The president was permanently informed of the operations by the chief of the national intelligence and by the Army Commander General of Operations of the Grupo Colina (Colina Group), before, during and after the operations.” “The operations were ordered by Vladimiro Montesinos and General Hermoza-Rios,[…],but they always had the consent of the President