8 “unexpected events.” It asserted that “it acted within the existing legal framework” and “in keeping with its ability to prevent the crimes of the case” from happening.” The State justified that it was impossible for it to prevent the crimes “taking into account not only the modus operandi of the outlawed armed groups (…) but also that the public authorities had not been informed about the potential existence of a particular and known danger in advance with respect to these persons.” It also contended that the presence of the Army was sporadic because its assets in the area were limited and, therefore, “the army patrolled by day and never at night, when most of the abductions took place.” 36. Regarding the rights of the child, the State claimed that “it is necessary to prove that the violation was committed based on the status as a minor of the person affected by the violation.” According to the State, it has not been proven in the particular circumstances of the case, that the State was obligated to grant special protection. It also contended that it is plausible that non-state actors committed the acts that infringed the rights of the children, based on their condition as such. 37. As for humane treatment of the next-of-kin, it alleged that infringements of particular individuals’ rights have not been proven and that such a violation cannot be presumed, not even in cases of forced disappearance. 38. The State argued that there was no violation of the right to a fair trial and judicial protection. It contended that the military criminal court found it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, inasmuch as it established that military personnel were not involved in the crimes charged in the complaint and that there was clear evidence establishing that the perpetrators of the crimes were members of the paramilitary group. Regarding the criminal proceedings, the State recognized that “it is aware that in this case there has not been an adequate result in the criminal proceeding” and that “the failure to identify all of those responsible is due to the complexity of the crime.” It argued that should the issue of State responsibility be considered, it could only be with regard to Article 8.1 of the Convention and not with regard to the rights relating to forced disappearance. It further contended that the failure to investigate the actions of third parties does not mean that the State is responsible for acts committed by third parties. It stressed that no concrete infringements of due process of the law have been proven and that the duty to investigate involves an obligation of means or to put forth best efforts, which cannot be regarded as a breach in the absence of a desired result. 39. The State reported that an investigation was opened of the leader of the Self-Defense Forces of Magdalena Medio, Ramón Isaza; and Army Major Carlos Guzmán. It noted that a preventive detention order was issued for the former as alleged perpetrator of the crime of abduction and that it refrained from issuing any custody order for Carlos Guzmán, because the witnesses who charged him “made indefinite assessments and inferences without any evidentiary support.” 40. In response to the point raised by the petitioners regarding the legal assessment of the offenses under investigation in the cases, it noted that the criminal proceeding conducted by the National Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Unit (hereinafter “UNDH,” based on its Spanish initials) was for the crimes of forced disappearance and homicide. Notwithstanding, the State asserted that the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish does not necessarily mean that criminal prosecution must be for the specific crime of forced disappearance. 41. The State claimed that the proceedings against Ramón Isaza are taking place under Justice and Peace Law No. 975 of 2005. It noted that, in its opinion, the Court held in the case of La Rochela Massacre that said law conforms to international standards. It further contended that his