-118Office of the Delegate Attorney for the defense of human rights, “so that it could order the necessary measures, since there had been a possible violation of Decree No. 085/89 [which established the Armed Forces Disciplinary Regime], by Captain Álvaro Gómez Luque, Commander of the San Pedro de Urabá military base.” On April 30, 1990, the said Delegate Attorney’s Office decided to open “a formal disciplinary inquiry” to clarify the conduct of the National Army officers who, at the time of the facts, were the commanders of the San Pedro de Urabá military base and the checkpoint in the same place (supra paras. 95(128) and 95(129)). 196. Subsequently, several investigatory measures were taken (supra paras. 95(1300 to 95(135)). On November 27, 1991, the Office of the Delegate Attorney for the defense of human rights decided to absolve the officers who had been the commanders of the San Pedro de Urabá military base and roadblock from the charges that had been filed, due to the “doubt that had arisen in the proceedings concerning the possible disciplinary responsibility of these officers.” In this decision, the Office devoted a large part of its analysis to questioning and nullifying the probative value of the statement made by Rogelio de Jesús Escobar Mejía, despite which, it indicated that “it is not possible to reject the alleged participation of a lieutenant and other soldiers to which he alluded completely, since his statement agrees in part with that of the witnesses […]” (supra para. 95(136)). 197. Later, on September 20, 1996, the Delegate Attorney’s Office ordered the opening of a new preliminary inquiry into the possible active conduct of the officers investigated (supra para. 95(141)). On February 12, 1998, the Delegate Attorney’s Office ordered a series of measures to be taken (supra para. 95(142)) and on August 16 that year it ordered the opening of a disciplinary investigation against Lieutenant Fabio Enrique Rincón Pulido. On July 31, 2000, the Office of the Delegate Disciplinary Attorney absolved this officer of all disciplinary responsibility, and this was confirmed on February 9, 2001 (supra paras. 95(145) and 95(147)). 198. It should also be noted that these procedures took approximately 11 years from the first procedural actions until the decision in consultation with the Disciplinary Chamber of the Attorney General’s Office; this cannot be considered a recourse executed within a reasonable time. 199. It is also relevant to consider the nature of the offences investigated and the mandate of the body in charge of the investigation. 200. The Court appreciates the seriousness and diligence of the investigation carried out by the Office of the Delegate Attorney for the defense of human rights, when ordering the collection and reception of pertinent probative elements and thus becoming the sole national mechanism for investigating the possible connection of members of the Colombian military forces with the events in Pueblo Bello, even in the hypothesis of the forced disappearance of persons. However, the purpose of these investigations was limited to determining the individual responsibilities of a disciplinary nature of a total of three Army officers for the said facts. The investigations carried out did not categorically rule out the participation of members of the Armed Forces or other State security units in the massacre and even left open this possibility. Although, in both proceedings, the Attorney General’s Office considered that Escobar Mejía’s statement was insufficient evidence to attribute disciplinary responsibility to the officers investigated, who it absolved by according them the benefit of the doubt, it is clear that its decisions did not eliminate the possibility that the Armed Forces were involved in the facts. Even in the decision of