-1436. In addition to the above-mentioned judgments, the Court has been particularly emphatic in others about the need to follow an integrating (and never disaggregating) interpretation of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, considering them together. For example, in Cantos v. Argentina (Judgment of November 28, 2002), the Court underscored the importance of the right of access to justice, embodied, lato sensu, in both Article 25 and Article 8(1) of the Convention, and added that: "Any domestic law or measure that imposes costs or in any other way obstructs the individuals’ access to the courts [...] must be regarded as contrary to Article 8(1) of the Convention."32 37. Article 8(1) is thus correctly understood by the Court to be inextricably linked to the right to an effective recourse under Article 25 of the Convention. In keeping with this reasoning, in Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago (Judgment of June 21, 2002), the Court recalled its obiter dictum in Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 to the effect that there is no "due process of law" if a defendant is unable to assert his rights "effectively" (i.e. in the absence of genuine access to justice) and added that, "for due process of law" it is necessary to observe "all the requirements" that are designed "to ensure or assert the entitlement to a right or the exercise thereof" (paras. 146 and 147). 38. This is the significant consistent case law of the Court to emancipate the individual, patiently developed over recent years. And this is why I defend it so staunchly (because I have spent a long time considering it and it has benefited many cases), in the same way that I am firmly opposed to current attempts within the court to dismantle it, disassociating Article 8 from Article 25, apparently due to mere dilettantism or some other reason that I am unable to understand. The Court’s case law in line with the position I maintain is not exhausted on that point. In Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala (judgment of November 25, 2000), the Court expressly considered "the guarantees embodied in Article 8 and the judicial protection established in Article 25 of the Convention" together, in order to examine the alleged violations of rights in that case (para. 187). And, in Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala (judgment of November 25, 2003), it stated very significantly that: "[...] The Court must examine the domestic judicial proceedings as a whole to attain a comprehensive perception of them and to establish whether the said actions contravene the standards on the right to fair trial and judicial protection and the right to an effective remedy, derived from Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention." 33 39. Only an integrating interpretation, such as the one that I have been maintaining and developing within the Court for more than a decade can provide the necessarily comprehensive vision of the violation of one or more rights protected by the Convention, with direct consequences for the appropriate determination of reparations. This is an additional point that should not be overlooked. In another well-known case, which has already been examined in books specifically dedicated to it34 - the "Street Children" (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala (judgment of November 19, 1999) - the Court again maintained that: 32 Paras. 50 and 52 of this judgment. 33 Para. 201 of this judgment (emphasis added). . . 34 . Cf., regarding the Case of the “Street Children", e.g.: CEJIL, Crianças e Adolescentes -