-7information on one of the points that was requested as useful evidence in the note of October 14, 2005, which had been reiterated on three occasions (supra para. 32). 38. On December 27, 2005, on the instructions of the President, the Secretariat granted until January 9, 2006, to the Commission and the representatives to submit any comments they deemed pertinent on the State’s brief of December 21, 2005, and its attachments (supra para. 37); these were presented on January 9, 2006. V PRIOR CONSIDERATIONS 39. Before recording its findings with regard to the evidence and its assessment, determining the proven facts and deciding on the State’s responsibility in the instant case, the Court considers it necessary to examine some statements made by the parties concerning the preliminary objections filed by the State, the Court’s jurisdiction, and the participation of the alleged victims’ next of kin through their representatives. * 40. First, in a brief submitted on October 25, 2004, with its answer to the application (supra para. 25), the State filed a preliminary objection in the proceedings before the Court for alleged defects in the processing of the case before the Commission. Specifically, the objection filed by the State was entitled “noncompliance with requirements for applying the exceptions to exhaustion of domestic remedies in order to declare the admissibility of a petition,” based on what the State described as two “grounds.” 41. With regard to what it called the “first grounds” for the preliminary objection, the State questioned the Commission’s decision, when examining the admissibility requirements with regard to the petitions that gave rise to the case, to apply the exceptions to the requirement of previous exhaustion of domestic remedies established in paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 46(2) of the Convention. The State submitted its arguments in the form of a preliminary objection, even though it acknowledged that “the moment at which the Court may rule on an allegation concerning domestic remedies will depend on the specific circumstances of each case.” In particular, the State argued that: (a) The Commission rejected the military criminal jurisdiction as an instrument for the administration of justice, disregarding the rule of law in force in Colombia. The facts occurred in 1990 and, therefore, they were investigated according to the mechanisms available for the administration of justice at that time. Even though the Commission recognizes military criminal justice as a component of the administration of justice in Colombia and notes the progress made in the Constitutional Court’s case law and in the Military Penal Code in delimiting and restricting jurisdictions, it forgot to examine the specific case in order to indicate the applicable norms at the time of the facts; (b) The Court has stated that the standard for measuring the effectiveness of a domestic remedy is its capacity to produce the result for which it was conceived. The Commission failed to examine the validity of the conclusions of the Colombian courts and simply rejected the result, merely because it derived from the military criminal justice system. The State does not accept