-92parties or individuals, within the framework of the State’s obligations to guarantee respect for those rights between individuals. In this regard, the Court has found that: This international responsibility may arise also from the acts of individuals, which, in principle, are not attributable to the State. [The obligations erga omnes to respect and ensure respect for the norms of protection, which is the responsibility of the States Parties to the Convention,] extend their effects beyond the relationship between its agents and the persons subject to its jurisdiction, because they are also manifest in the positive obligation of the State to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the effective protection of human rights in inter-individual relations. The attribution of responsibility to the State for the acts of individuals may occur in cases in which the State fails to comply with the obligations erga omnes contained in Articles (1) and 2 of the Convention, owing to the acts or omissions of its agents when they are in the position of guarantor.191 114. The Court has pointed out the existence of these effects of the Convention in relation to third parties in the exercise of its contentious192 and advisory193 functions, and also when it has ordered provisional measures to protect members of groups or communities from acts and threats by State agents and by individual third parties.194 115. Colombia alleged that the violation of a State obligation entailing its responsibility should be decided based on what it called “rigorous attribution structures that underlie the obligations contained the Convention.” Specifically, the State argued as follows: The existence of a list of negative and positive obligations in the Convention implies the possibility of asserting responsibility when they are impaired or violated by the State in question. However, in order to establish the violation of the obligations embodied in the Convention, it is essential to take into consideration the attribution structures. In other words, the determination of the State’s responsibility is strictly related to, or more exactly, conditioned by, verification of the specific violation of the obligation and not simply by the affirmation of this obligation. […] The structures for attributing responsibility to the State constitute numerus clausus; that is, they consist of a rigorous description of the events in which the violation of the treaty-based obligation can be attributed to the State in question. […] Outside of the attribution structures, it is impossible to make any kind of allegation of State responsibility. The State’s right would be violated if the rigorous nature of these 191 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 7, para. 111. 192 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 7, para. 112; Case of the Moiwana Community case, supra note 7, para. 211; Case of Tibi. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 108; Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers, supra note 188, para. 91; Case of the 19 Merchants, supra note 190, para. 183; Case of Maritza Urrutia, supra note 190, para. 71; Cae of Bulacio. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 111, and Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 189, para. 81. 193 In its Advisory Opinion on the Juridical Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, the Court indicated that “[…]the obligation to respect human rights between individuals should be taken into consideration. That is, the positive obligation of the State to ensure the effectiveness of the protected human rights gives rise to effects in relation to third parties (erga omnes). This obligation has been developed in legal writings, and particularly by the Drittwirkung theory, according to which fundamental rights must be respected by both the public authorities and by individuals with regard to other individuals.” Cf. Juridical Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 187, para. 140. 194 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 7, para. 112; Matter of the Mendoza Prisons. Provisional measures. Decision of June 18, 2005; Matter of the Pueblo Indigena de Sarayaku. Provisional measures. Decision of July 6 2004; Matter of the Pueblo Indigena Kankuamo. Provisional measures. Decision of July 5, 2004; Matter of the Communities of Jiguamiandó and the Curbaradó. Provisional measures. Decision of March 6, 2003. Series E No. 4, p. 169; Matter of the Peace Community of San José Apartadó. Provisional measures. Decision of June 18, 2002. Series E No. 4, p. 141, and Matter of the Urso Branco Prison. Provisional measures. Decision of June 18, 2002. Series E No. 4, p. 53.