-94The States have the obligation to guarantee the establishment of the conditions to ensure that violations of this inalienable right do not occur and, in particular, the obligation to prevent its agents from violating it.198 In compliance with the obligations imposed by Article 4 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, this not only assumes that no one shall be deprived of his life arbitrarily (negative obligation), but also, in light of the State’s obligation to guarantee the full and free exercise of human rights, it requires States to adopt all the appropriate measures to protect and preserve the right to life (positive obligation). This active protection of the right to life by the State involves not only its legislators, but all State institutions, and those responsible for safeguarding security, whether they are members of its police forces or its armed forces.199 Consequently, States must adopt the necessary measures, not only at the legislative, administrative and judicial level, by issuing penal norms and establishing a system of justice to prevent, eliminate and punish the deprivation of life as a result of criminal acts, but also to prevent and protect individuals from the criminal acts of other individuals and to investigate these situations effectively (infra paras. 125 to 127 and 142 to 146). 121. In this case, the State recognized that “the law enforcement personnel were guarantors of the respect, protection and guarantee of the human rights of the inhabitants of the jurisdiction of Pueblo Bello.” However, it maintained that “the treaty-based obligations cannot be an unacceptable burden for States; the State cannot be the guarantor of everything everywhere[. …] The State’s ability to react was limited by a critical situation of public order that made it impossible to cover all its territory, which is very extensive. [… T]here were military forces in the zone, so that the State […] had taken general measures of protection: precisely those in keeping with the State’s reaction capability.” In addition, the State alleged that: The existence of a material, functional and territorial jurisdiction of the public servants in the area in which the incidents occurred is not in discussion, because the members of he Armed Forces were present with a base and a military roadblock in the zone. Thus, it is clear that, in relation to the facts under examination, the obligations of the members of the Colombian Armed Forces were to protect the population and to guarantee security in the region, obligations that must be defined in the context of personal attribution. [According to the State, although] the presence of the soldiers in the zone and their protection of security there (especially in the case of the roadblock, as regards the guarantee of the rights of those who traveled along that route), form the grounds in this specific case [for compliance] with the general obligation to respect and protect the rights of the population[,…] this [is not] sufficient to determine the responsibility of the State[, because] to be able to attribute some form of responsibility to the Army who was the guarantor [it is necessary to prove] that the subject has created a legallyunacceptable danger, the first element of the so-called theory of objective attribution, widely recognized in penal doctrine. Humberto Sánchez, supra note 189, para. 110, and Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.). Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 144. 198 Cf. Case of the 19 Merchants, supra note 192, para. 153 citing United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comments 6/1982, para. 3 in Compilation of General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1 in 6 (1994); United Nations Human Rights Committee, General comment 14/1984, para. 1 in Compilation of General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1 in 18 (1994); Cf. also, Case of Myrna Mack Chang. Judgment of November 25, 2003, Series C No. 101, para. 152; Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, Judgment of June 7, 2003, Series C No. 99, para. 110, and Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.), supra note 197, para. 144. 199 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 7, para. 232; Case of Huilce Tecse. Judgment of March 3, 2005. Series C No. 121, para. 66, and Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute”, supra note 17, para. 129.