-18rights. Ultimately, underlying the said general rule of interpretation stipulated in the two Vienna Conventions (Article 31(1)), is the principle, widely supported by case law, according to which it is necessary to ensure that the treaty-based provisions produce the pertinent effects (the so-called effet utile). This principle, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, by which the interpretation should promote the appropriate effects of a treaty has (with regard to human rights) assumed particular importance in determining the broad scope of the treaty-based protection obligations.40 51. Indeed, this interpretation is the one that most faithfully reflects the special character of human rights treaties, the objective nature of the obligations they establish, and the autonomous meaning of the concepts they embody (distinct from the corresponding concepts in the context of national juridical systems). Since human rights treaties incorporate concepts with an autonomous meaning, deriving from the evolution of case law, and since the object and purpose of human rights treaties are distinct from the classic treaties (because they relate to relations between the State and the persons subject to its jurisdiction), the classic principles of interpretation of treaties in general adapt to this new reality.41 52. Moreover, Article 29(b) of the American Convention expressly prohibits any interpretation that restricts the exercise of the protected rights. Thus, any reorientation of the Court’s consistent case law, which integrates Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, would only be justified to the extent that it provided greater protection to the rights embodied therein, which is not the case. Until today, in the deliberations on this issue within the Court that are causing me concern (which, fortunately, did not occur in this case), I have never heard any evidence that de-linking or “separating” Article 8 from Article 25 would provide more effective protection for the rights enshrined in the American Convention. Rather, this would lead to an unfortunate and unjustifiable setback in the Court’s case law, particularly in view of the current general trend to the contrary of international case law on this issue. IX. Overcoming the difficulties concerning the right to an effective recourse in the case law of the European Court 53. Even if other international mechanisms for the supervision of human rights have labored under the uncertainties of a fragmenting interpretation, why should the Inter-American Court follow this path, abdicating its progressive case law – which has earned it the respect of the beneficiaries of our protection system as well as of international academic circles – and assume a different stance which has even been abandoned by other bodies that erroneously used to follow it? In my opinion, this makes no sense. 40 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado..., tome II, op. cit. supra No. (11), pp. 32-33 and 192. 41 . Ibid., pp. 32-34; and cf. also R. Bernhardt, "Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties", in Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension - Studies in Honour of G.J. Wiarda (eds. F. Matscher and H. Petzold), Köln, C. Heymanns, 1988, pp. 66-67 and 70-71; Erik Suy, "Droit des traités et droits de l'homme", in Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Menschenrechte Festschrift für H. Mosler (eds. R. Bernhardt et alii), Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1983, pp. 935-947; and J. Velu and R. Ergec, La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1990, p. 51.