-8judgments of this type and invoked the application of the Court’s opinion in the Genie Lacayo case; (c) Regarding the opinions on the effectiveness of the proceedings before the ordinary justice system, the Commission made an inexact summary of the decisions taken to date by the competent judges, in order to describe those recourses over-hastily as useless, disregarding the progress made and the results, and also the complexity of the case and the efforts made by the State to investigate the facts, and prosecute and punish those responsible; (d) The State has complied with all the requirements of case law, the treaties, and the principle of the burden of proof for it to be acknowledged that domestic remedies have not been exhausted, so that the petition that gave rise to case No. 11,748 should not have been found admissible; and (e) The Commission applied unduly the exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46(2)(a) and (c) of the Convention, and this led to an improper processing of the petition that gave rise to the case and generated grounds for rejecting the application.1 42. With regard to the “second grounds,” the State argued that the Commission had not complied with the “concept of a reasonable time limit” when admitting the petition. According to the provisions of Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention, it is generally required that the petition or communication should be lodged within six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the final judgment. However – the State indicated – the treaty-based period of six months is not required when, in the Commission’s opinion, there are circumstances in which an exception should be made to the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, according to the Commission’s parameters for the admission of a petition established in Article 32(2) of its Rules of Procedure. Specifically, the State declared that: (a) Article 32(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure establishes the parameters that the Commission should take into account when considering whether the period of time within which the petition was presented is reasonable, in those cases when the treaty-based time limit of six months from notification of the final judgment established in 46(1)(b) of the Convention cannot be required; (b) Procedural norms are inflexible and peremptory; consequently, even if the case before the Commission is not contentious, it is obliged to respect the time limits and comply with its treaty-based role with the prudence and reasonableness required by its mandate; (c) The Commission is obliged to respect the time limits established in the Convention and, in the case of exceptions, such as in the instant case, it should require a reasonable time limit for the presentation of a petition. The Commission failed to comply with this concept of reasonableness when it admitted a petition concerning facts that occurred slightly more than seven years ago, and neither the petition nor the Admissibility Report explain this delay; 1 Cf. brief with preliminary objections, answer to the application and with observations on the requests and arguments brief (merits file, tome II, pp. 6 to 8, folios 352 to 354).